

THE APPEAL OF SOVEREIGNTY

Hungary, Austria and Russia

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Social Science Monographs, Boulder, Colorado
Atlantic Research and Publications, Inc.
Highland Lakes, New Jersey

Distributed by Columbia University Press, New York
1998

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The publication of this volume was made possible by a grant from
Pénzügykutató Alapítvány [Financial Research Foundation],
Budapest

Originally published as *A szuverenitás káprázata*
© 1996 Korridor, Politikai Kutatások Központja,
Budapest

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Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 97-76982
ISBN 0-88033-401-0

Printed in the United States of America

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IMAGES OF SOVEREIGNTY

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PREFACE TO THE SERIES

The present volume is a component of a series which when completed will constitute a comprehensive survey of the many aspects of East Central European society.

The books in the series deal with the peoples whose homelands lie between the Germans to the west, the Russians to the east and the Mediterranean and Adriatic Seas to the south. They constitute a particular civilization, one that is at once an integral part of Europe, yet substantially different from the West. The area is characterized by a rich variety in language, religion, and government. The study of this complex area demands a multidisciplinary approach and, accordingly, our contributors to the series represent several academic disciplines. They have been drawn from universities and other scholarly institutions in the United States and Western Europe, as well as East Central Europe.

The editor in chief, of course, takes full responsibility for ensuring the comprehensiveness, cohesion, internal balance, and scholarly quality of the series. He cheerfully accepts this responsibility and intends this work to be neither a justification nor condemnation of the policies, attitudes, and activities of any persons involved. At the same time, because the contributors to the series represent so many disciplines, interpretations, and schools of thought, his policy in this, as in the past and future volumes, is to present their contributions without major modifications.

Béla K. Király

János Mátyás Kovács

IMAGES OF SOVEREIGNTY *Austria's Changing Identity*

Austria-Hungary is no longer. I do not care to live elsewhere. Emigration is out of the question. I live with a torso and convince myself that it is perfection itself.

Sigmund Freud

Lately, my letters from far-off United States are again addressed "Vienna, Australia." This was not always so. For a while, in the midst of the Kurt Waldheim scandal between 1986 and 1992, my overseas acquaintances were able to distinguish temporarily between the home of tame Alpine cattle and that of the wild kangaroos. This sudden geographical enlightenment was due exclusively to the forgetful president of the Austrian Republic who, when nominated for the post of United Nations Secretary General in the seventies, neglected to mention in his curriculum vitae the fact that he had been a Wehrmacht intelligence officer in the Balkans during World War II and a witness, if nothing else, to highly suspicious events. In 1986, however, Austria stubbornly went on to elect Waldheim president, who was then boycotted for years by the West.

But let us forget this sensational scandal and return to Austria's dull—"Australian"—everyday life. I would not go as far as to say that First Lieutenant Waldheim's reluctant withdrawal—without offering apologies or a formal resignation—evoked a cathartic change in Austrian mind¹ and started an "everyday era" of Austrian history.

¹ See W. Johnston, *The Austrian Mind* (Berkeley, 1972); P. Bettelheim and R. Harauer, eds., *Öscharme mit Westkomfort: Beiträge zur politischen Kultur in Österreich* (Vienna, 1994); G. Botz and G. Sprengnagel, eds., *Kontroversen um Österreichs Zeitgeschichte* (Frankfurt, 1994); and E. Bruckmüller, *Österreichbewusstsein im Wandel: Identität und Identität und Selbstverständnis in*

What actually happened was that the president's affair coincided with the beginnings of the reinterpretation of Austrian collective identity (if there is such a thing). It accelerated the self-examination which had long been urged by the "other Austria"² which wished to break through the collective amnesia while attempting to bring a touch of reality to Austria's delusory history and adjust the remainder of the Austrian Miracle to Central European slouching. The evolving self-image of Austrians may be somewhat blurred today, still, it is far less deceptive than it was only a decade ago. We might even call this new-fangled, somewhat uncertain sobriety a normalization of Austrian identity.

Why do I speak of self-identity if it was the Austrian variant of state sovereignty I was asked to discuss? The reason is simple: Austria's postwar history of forty years is a perfect example of showing how the individually weak, but collectively strong pillars of

den 90er Jahren, *Schriftenreihe des Zentrums für angewandte Politikforschung* (Vienna, 1994), vol. 4. On the Waldheim case, see the studies by Gerhard Botz, Robert Knight, Félix Kreissler, Siegfried Mattl, and Wolfgang Neugebauer in Botz and Sprengnagel, eds., op. cit.; and also the chapters by Breuss, Liebhart, and Pribersky in S. Breuss, K. Liebhart, and A. Pribersky, *Inszenierungen* (Vienna, 1995); R. Menasse, *Das Land ohne Eigenschaften, Essay zur österreichischen Identität* (Vienna, 1992); A. Pelinka, *Zur österreichischen Identität: Zwischen deutscher Vereinigung und Mitteleuropa* (Vienna, 1990); R. Sieder, H. Steinert, and E. Tálos, eds., *Österreich: 1945–1995: Gesellschaft, Politik, Kultur* (Vienna, 1990); R. Wodak et al., *Wir sind alle unschuldige Täter: diskurshistorische Studien zum Nachkriegsantisemitismus* (Frankfurt, 1990); Kurt Waldheim, *Die Antwort* (Vienna, 1996).

² "Other Austria" is a generic term used to describe the intellectual kinship of the one-time Austrian resistance movement, the anti-nuclear and ecological movements of the seventies, and the current groups of republican (leftist-liberal, alternative, critical) intellectuals, see Breuss, et al., op. cit. See also J. Haslinger, *Politik der Gefühle: Ein Essay über Österreich* (Darmstadt, 1987); R. Menasse, *Die sozialpartnerschaftliche fiktionalität* (Vienna, 1991); Menasse, *Das Land ohne Eigenschaften*; R. Menasse, *Histerien und andere historische Irrtümer* (Vienna, 1996); W. Müller-Funk, "Das Land des Lächelns," in *Der intellektuelle als Souverän* (Vienna, 1995); G. Nennig, "Neutralität und Realität: Eine unnötige Unterscheidung," in H. Krejci, E. Reiter, and H. Schneider, eds., *Neutralität—Mythos und Wirklichkeit* (Vienna, 1992).

national identity prop up the precarious sovereignty of a small country and how the erosion of some of these pillars would render it shaky again. I would like to discuss the imaginary, yet real pillars of state sovereignty, a kind of "virtual sovereignty" which successfully displaced (or complemented) the sovereignty created and protected by material authority—as long as it could. I shall speak mostly about neutrality since it carried the greatest weight among the pillars of national identity. I should like to show how the idea of neutrality conceived by Realpolitik rose to mythical heights, why it lost most of its meaning with dizzying swiftness, and how today's Austrian politics tries to part with it as quietly as possible.

* * *

I am going to tell a story, a personal rather than a disciplined one. I am not an international lawyer, or a political scientist, nor a historian, nor a working on Austria. I also admit that other than the personal socialist experience of "limited sovereignty," I did not have much to do with the legal mysteries of state independence. Sociology will often provide the keynote in the story and, though I am an economist, I shall rarely mention the economic aspects of sovereignty. I have only one reason for joining this circle of experts and a very prosaic one at that: for almost ten years now I have been commuting between Vienna and Budapest, I read the newspapers and attend conferences in both countries. The radical (yet quiet) revision of the Austrian concept of sovereignty conceived in the fifties has been taking place right before my eyes. Possibly, I am not so close to Vienna that I would not see the forest for the tree, nor so far from Budapest that I would not guess what in Austria's history of sovereignty may be of interest to the Hungarian reader. And since this history does not lack irony, at times even the grotesque, please excuse some occasional teasing remarks. Teasing—why deny it—frequently conceals jealous acknowledgment.

Being Innocent after Divorce

Austro-fascism and national socialism were wed
in an ideological marriage; we may concede Austria was not a
virgin raped, yet forced she was (and how) and only
then did she give herself.

Félix Kreissler

Bella gerant alii, tu felix Austria nube...—the image of a lucky (happy?) empire which expands and prospers cunningly by way of marriages rather than war is not merely a memory of a bygone era. It continued to constitute an important element of Austrian national identity even after 1955, when the Austrian State Treaty restored, so to speak, the independence and territorial integrity of the Second Republic. Undoubtedly, in the fifties, Austria was in dire need of a little happiness in order to recover from the adversities of the twentieth century. Defeat in World War I and the collapse of the Habsburg empire, the Austro-fascist degeneration of the First Republic, the fatal polarization of political classes and the *Anschluss*, degradation of Austria into *Ostmark* then complete absorption into the Third Reich and, finally, another defeat in World War II all played parts in the near erasure of the country from the map as a sovereign state. For ten years after 1945, it awaited the decision on its fate (would the Allied occupation forces and the four military zones remain, would there be a German style division of the country, or would it be swallowed by the Soviet Union—as were its Eastern neighbors), until, allegedly, it regained sovereignty as well as its national self-respect. This time it did not have to marry but it took all the more effort to keep from entering a bad marriage or, more exactly, to survive a divorce case.³

³ See Botz and Sprengnagel, eds., op. cit.; P. Dusek, A. Pelinka, and E. Weinzierl, *Zeitgeschichte im Aufriß: Österreich seit 1918* (Vienna, 1988); W. Mantl, ed., *Politik in Österreich: Die Zweite Republik: Bestand und Wandel* (Vienna, 1992); A. Pelinka and E. Weinzierl, eds., *Das grosse Tabu: Österreichs Umgang mit seiner Vergangenheit* (Vienna, 1987); H. Portisch, *Österreich I*, vols. 1–2 (Munich, 1994); H. Portisch and R. Riff, *Österreich II*, vols. 1–4 (Munich, 1995); Austria. Bundeskanzleramt, *Rot-weiss-rot-Buch, Gerechtigkeit*

During the Cold War the Allied parents went their separate ways and sought long for a solution to the complicated issue, namely, that if one could not have custody of the child then neither should the other. Meanwhile, the child could feel like anything but grown-up. Since 1918 there was plenty of time to get used to being humiliated. Having shrivelled from a monarchy into a republic ("a state no one wanted") it was under the control of the League of Nations for a long time and matured under harsh conditions, surrounded by the Little Entente, Italy, and Germany, only to become one of the states of the Third Reich after the *Anschluss*.⁴ Up to 1944 Winston Churchill wanted to wed Austria to Bavaria and establish a South German confederation (or a Central and Southeast European or Danubian confederation including also non-Germanic peoples). The Soviets, who previously spoke about the restoration of an independent Austria, occupied (liberated) most of the country in 1945 and established themselves in the eastern provinces. In fact, in 1950 they had the daring, though not the power, to impose a delayed "popular-democratic" turn. Earlier Austria already had to relinquish South Tirol to Italy; after World War I it successfully opposed Slovenian territorial claims, but after World War II Tito's army reached as far as Klagenfurt, and again there was talk of dividing the Burgenland between Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Clemenceau's ghost haunted the Alps, who had said when the Monarchy disintegrated: "*Autriche—c'est le reste.*"

für Österreich! (Vienna, 1946); G. Stourzh, *Geschichte des österreichischen Staatsvertrages: 1945–1955* (Vienna, 1985); G. Stourzh, *Vom Reich zur Republik: Studien zum Österreichbewusstsein im 20. Jahrhundert* (Vienna, 1990); E. Weinzierl and K. Skalník, eds., *Das neue Österreich: Geschichte der Zweiten Republik* (Graz, 1975); E. Weinzierl and K. Skalník, eds., *Österreich: 1918–1938: Geschichte der Ersten Republik* (Graz, 1983).

⁴ After occupation by or union with Germany the country became the *Ostmark*, a name reminiscent of the Middle Ages. Later it was renamed the Alpine and Danubian Reich Provinces. At this time, in order to resolve the contradictory situation of "Eastern Reich" within the Third Reich and to obliterate the last linguistic memorial to independent statehood, the denominations, Ober- and Niederösterreich (Upper and Lower Austria), were also erased. Thenceforth these provinces could only be called Ober- and Niederdonau Gau.

"Truncated Austria is not a country," the Austrian irredentists would have proclaimed between the wars had they been familiar with the Hungarian slogan; anyway they, too, sought Nazi Germany's patronage—and we know with what results.

But do we really know? I doubt it. Speaking for myself, it never occurred to me to try and find out why a "state treaty" instead of a peace treaty was signed with Austria after 1945. Lawyers, however, know that the country simply did not exist from the point of view of international law, it had to be defined as a state. By others—for the lack of anything better. Decency demanded a return to democracy. Again: led and supervised by others, for the lack of anything better. However noble the goal (the majority of Austrians were probably not convinced of it at the time), a paternalistic situation like this does not usually help a country's self-respect.

Not so in Austria. Paradoxically, at first it was mostly in the Austrians' interest to contest their own statehood in order to avoid being named a defeated and guilty country, thus, liable to pay reparations. They again made use of Hans Kelsen's idea that had worked so well in legal disputes after the collapse of the Monarchy. The first postwar Austrian governments declared: we did not start the war, how could we, when we were not yet a state—or no longer a state. Germany is responsible for everything that happened after March 1938, not Austria, only a few Austrians committed war crimes, whom we will punish, but until then give the country generous support. If Germany is the sole culprit, then all German and Germanized assets in Austria belong to the liberators, the Soviets said and the other Allies gave a nod of assent. This meant that the Soviet Union, which could not interpret the concept of German assets broadly enough, became seriously interested financially in postponing military withdrawal. For ten years German assets were the pretext for putting off withdrawal, and afterwards the Soviet Union exacted exorbitant reparations from enterprises it had stripped bare in the meantime. Perhaps Kelsen's idea was not so good after all.

In addition, whenever the opportunity arose, the Soviets raked up the old accusation of Austria being an accessory to crime. The Allied Powers failed to define clearly Austria's position in spite of the fact that in 1943 they had decided at their Moscow meeting that Austria

was Hitler's first victim,⁵ not his henchman, and as a subjugated country it did not enter the war of its own will. Under Soviet pressure a passage about the joint responsibility of Austrians was also included in the Moscow Declaration, which formed the basis of all subsequent negotiations. Under these conditions, Austria could hardly be a victor or, at least, an innocent victim, yet definitely worthy of independence. More exactly, it could be made independent. It was already known who would guarantee this independence, but not who it was to be independent from. Certainly from Germany, no matter how many Germanies there were. The victorious powers were united in not wanting to see Germany and Austria under the same roof. Everything else was determined by given geopolitical positions. Anything could postpone the final settlement: from the Sovietization of Eastern Europe, through the Trieste tug-of-war and the Korean war, to the German question. True, these "anythings" were weighty problems, but—trusting in the strategic importance of the Alps—Austria, too, could consider itself a weighty issue.

Austria's defenselessness was enhanced by the fact that, though innocently this time, its fate again became linked with Germany's. Every settlement proposal, whoever made it, was weighed from the point of view of the precedent it would create for German reunification or partitioning. This was especially true of the question of neutrality. I am talking about the neutrality that became the cornerstone of Austrian identity, the celebrated associate concept of sovereignty, virtually a state philosophy from 1955 onward. Too bad that the idea did not come from the heart. Too bad, because Austria had to pay for sovereignty partly with neutrality, however profitable the latter eventually proved to be.

⁵ The Austro-fascist opposition to Nazism (the oppression of the Nazi *Putsch* in 1934, the distance Dollfuss and Mussolini kept from Hitler, Schuschnigg's attempts to postpone the *Anschluss*, etc.) hardly explain the decision. The Allies did not wish to face a Greater Germany again after the war. In the meantime they would have liked to urge Austrians to turn against the "subjugators."

Neutralized But Free?

We, Austrians want to be neutral primarily in terms of ourselves. Neutrality is a wonderful way to sneak out of our own history.

Armin Thurnher

Legend has it that Austria had longed for neutrality for decades and could hardly wait after its occupation to give voice to this desire. It reasoned and wheedled to make the reluctant Allies see this as the most advantageous solution. The whole world conspired against it (accordingly, the main sin of the Cold War was probably that it prevented the settlement of the Austrian question), but the country took the matter into its own hands and proclaimed neutrality. I know I am exaggerating. Let me say by way of excuse that I have just finished struggling my way through a large part of the almost endless literature written on this myth.⁶

The idea of neutrality did appear once in a while in Austrian political discourse after both world wars, though much less articulately and more ambiguously than later. Actually, the original version (Kelsen's, of course), also known as quasi-neutrality, calls only for the mere fact (but not necessarily a declaration of the fact) that the country does not join non-neutral countries, does not start a war and, if there is a war, will elect to stay out.⁷ The memory of the *Anschluss* induced the leaders of the Second Republic to note wisely that "it

⁶ See the most frequently mentioned and most objective comprehensive legal works of Manfred Rotter, *Bewaffnete Neutralität. Das Beispiel Österreich* (Frankfurt, 1985); M. Schweitzer, *Dauernde Neutralität und europäische Integration* (Vienna, 1997); Verdross, *Die immerwährende Neutralität Österreichs* (Vienna, 1977); also Verosta's, Ermacora's, and Zemanek's. Schlesinger's book is a good example of a foreign critical analysis of the subject. T. Schlesinger, *Austrian Neutrality in Postwar Europe* (Vienna, 1972).

⁷ On the concept of quasi-neutrality, see F. Ermacora, *20 Jahre österreichische Neutralität* (Frankfurt, 1975); Manfred Rotter, *Die dauernde Neutralität* (Berlin, 1981); Verosta, *Die dauernde Neutralität: Ein Grundriss* (Vienna, 1967). World War I peace treaties neutralized Austria to prevent its union with Germany. In the twenties and thirties Austria was accountable for its neutrality to the League of Nations in order to be eligible for vitally important loans.

would have been better to stay out of the whole thing" and "the West was in no rush to intervene." At first, a number of Social Democrats—brooding over the skirmishes between the *Schutzbund* and the *Heimwehr* in the thirties—were averse even to the idea of a new Austrian army. Young and old (the old most certainly) wanted to join the West, but the political elite were afraid that combative support of this desire would be tantamount to declaring the country divided, and quite likely part of the country would then be caught in the Soviet sphere of influence. They thought that it would be best to keep a friendly distance from the Soviet Union; this, however, would require the simultaneous withdrawal of the Western powers; but if the West leaves, who will be there to protect Austria should the Soviet Union change its mind? Consequently, Austrian statesmen thought twice before they mentioned the word neutrality. Little was said about the Swiss example, so frequently cited later. Actually, the occupying powers were also hesitant when they were not improvising.

Initially, the Soviet Union was afraid that if it gave up Austria, it would encourage the neighboring countries to follow suit. Concurrently, by way of explaining the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary and Romania, the Soviet Union argued that these ensured the supply lines for the army stationed beyond the Leitha River. At the same time, the United States and its allies worried that Austria's neutrality would break the strategic line which extended from Italy to Norway (greatly worrying the Soviet Union), and which was to become the NATO chain of countries. They did not relish the idea of supporting the establishment of a peaceful Danubian confederation either, nor did the Soviet Union, for different reasons, as it may have lead to handing over the country to the enemy. Although the neutralization and demilitarization of Austria seemed a logical solution to the stalemate, it might have tempted Germany, not to mention the Central and East European states, to request similar treatment. They might have rightly asked if they could also be granted neutral status. The strategic vacuum that demilitarization might have created also alarmed the generals on both sides. What if the enemy fills the vacuum first?

For this reason, prolonging the zone system seemed a tolerable compromise until a few important decisions were reached in the

region (communist takeovers in Eastern and Central Europe, the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the German Democratic Republic (GDR), and NATO, NATO membership of the FRG, etc.), in other words, until the new division of Europe was accomplished. Austria had to wait patiently for the first wave of a reduction in the international tension after Stalin's death. And also for the Soviets to be finally willing to relinquish the German enterprises they had confiscated. Meanwhile, Austria may have thought that the two blocs would celebrate the end to the ten-year-long wrangle with its help, but in honesty it had to admit that slowly but surely its sovereignty was rationed out. The Western states were faster, the Russians slower to portion out freedom.

The Allied Council interfered in high state affairs of the Second Republic with less and less frequency. Legislation of constitutional laws required the preliminary consent of the Council and it had the right of veto, as far as the lower level legislation was concerned, within a one month period. Austria proved a diligent pupil in restoring capitalism, which explains the increasing inactivity of the Western members of the Council. They frowned only when the other ally, the Soviet Union, attempted to discipline their pupil. In the evolving Cold War they were becoming increasingly involved with one another, and the cunning pupil began to fish in troubled waters. Let a brief list suffice here of the abundant "occupation school" regulations which Austria sought to abandon later on. In 1950 the Austrian government asked for the following modifications: to cease charging the expenses of the occupation to the country; to return a number of seized houses and apartments; to end military justice, not to arrest Austrians, and to allow Austrian police to arrest members of the occupying forces if they violate Austrian law; to restore to Austria the right to issue visas; to allow local forces to supervise the zones if occupation troops remain; to end censorship of the press and postal services (as well as school textbooks), confiscation of books, banning theatre productions, interference in radio programming; to cease free hunting and fishing by allied officers, to void the requirement of way-bills in domestic transportation, and permits for erecting pylons, for maintenance work on roads; to reinvest the president of the republic with the right to grant amnesty, to lift the obligation on Austrian

authorities to answer every question raised by the occupation forces. All this took place in the fifth year of democracy. Another three years had to pass before these requests were examined. Not in the least because of the cooling of atmosphere among the "school staff" between 1949 and 1953.

Solving the Austrian question was not a pressing issue, especially not for the Soviets, although in the spring of 1949 it seemed the Austrian State Treaty was about to be signed. Tito had broken relations with Moscow, alleviating the fear that the territorial claims of Yugoslavia would torpedo the treaty. By the end of 1947, the Soviets agreed to the redemption of confiscated German assets by cash payments and in kind. Austrian leaders would have agreed to the establishment of a "Soviet economic enclave"⁸ after the departure of the Red Army, but the Western allies warned that on the pretext of protecting its property the owner might return at any time—armed. At this time no one, except Austria, mentioned that the country might eventually have its own army. There was also complete silence on the question of neutrality.

Meanwhile, President Harry Truman proclaimed the policy of "containment" and Secretary of State George C. Marshall his recovery program; neither was independent of the Greek civil war and the communist grip on Eastern and Central Europe. Unafraid, Austria accepted assistance under the Marshall Plan and the Soviet Union paid almost no attention. The Christian and Social Democrats (ÖVP and SDÖ) joined forces and expelled communists from the government and the political police. Still the Soviets said nothing. Although in 1948 they did attempt to set up a blockade similar to the one in Berlin, they gave up after two days. The Austrian government acted in increasingly open complicity with the Western powers and became alarmed only when, with the establishment of NATO in 1949, United States policy stiffened; the Pentagon overshadowed the State

⁸ This would have included primarily industrial and commercial enterprises, including the oil fields in Lower Austria, appropriated by the Administration of Soviet Property in Austria (USIA). These enterprises operated within a plan system serving mainly indemnification purposes and also the strengthening of the influence of the Austrian communists. Portisch and Riff, *op. cit.*

Department and American generals began to speak about extending the occupation at a time when the Austrian State Treaty seemed already in sight.

The German knot was impossible to untie, but the Austrian held promise in the view of the negotiations in the spring of 1949. The great powers were adding finishing touches to the 1947 agreements and then parted in the knowledge that they would be celebrating in the fall. Neutrality was still not mentioned. Yet again, a few things intervened: the Soviet atomic bomb, communist victory in China, the break between the GDR and the FRG and, of course, the Trieste crisis. Austria was not invited to join the NATO, but was expected to hold out for a few days if attacked from the East. Then came the Korean war and the sad lesson was learned: wherever the Western powers move out, the East moves in. Thus, Moscow's willingness to withdraw became immediately suspect. Military strategists began to show appreciation for Austria. In the words of an American general: it took half an hour to fly from Munich to Milan, now—if we leave Austria—it will take two hours because of the need to bypass Switzerland and fly over France. Soviet command knew that it had more things to lose if the Pentagon won and the Americans stayed in Austria. True, the Red Army could also stay in the Danube region, but the mountains, the fearsome Alpenfestung, as they learned in World War II would belong to the enemy.

The Soviet threat was very real at that time. In the fall of 1950 the Austrian Communist Party, in a last effort, attempted a takeover, taking advantage of the popular dissatisfaction with the economic stabilization program. An interference by any of the occupying powers would have—it is better not to even think about it. The government, however, remained firm and the Social Democratic unions proved stronger than the communist activists. Needless to say, this capacity for democracy did not enhance the Soviet's trust in Austria. The Soviet Union must have known that if the country were divided, it would not be able to pacify the Soviet zone. The Western powers were not so hopeful. They decided to stay until the country became economically stable and a sort of army (*B-Gendarmerie*) was established in their zones. In all seriousness, they were getting ready to evacuate the government and the male population of military age to

Italy.⁹ They did not really seek consensus with the enemy, only probed its flexibility in a brief agreement in 1952 (timed provocatively to coincide with the anniversary of the *Anschluss*). With shamelessly they proposed to withdraw, to guarantee the 1937 boundaries, to return all German assets to Austria, and to prohibit only political flirtation with Germany.

The Soviet Union reacted angrily: citing Austria's quiet rearmament (not without reason), the conciliatory treatment of Nazis (also with some justification),¹⁰ the Trieste question, etc., they became obdurate. This lasted until the Russian troika assumed power after Stalin's death and the Austrians gathered enough courage (and permission) to take the initiative. In the summer of 1953, following innumerable negotiations and signing of all sorts of partial agreements, events accelerated (with Nehru's mediation). Austria tentatively mentioned that it would not join NATO after the Soviet Union withdrew its forces but form a neutral zone with Switzerland. But what are the guarantees, politicians asked in Moscow and Washington. All the same, both sides felt that there was something to the idea. The great unknown was hidden in the precise meaning of neutrality. Diplomats demanded that their legal advisors help them define the concept so that it would satisfy everyone, but their side would profit from it. Or, at least, lose little by it. Solving this puzzle took another two years.

The Soviet Union stated that the necessary precondition for withdrawal was that Austria would not join either of the blocs and that final withdrawal would take place only after the peace treaty with Germany was signed. Initially, the West rejected both proposals (but Austria resented only the second) then, after long deliberation,

⁹ The recent discovery of illegal arsenals in various parts of the country caused a scandal. When the Western Allies withdrew from Austria, they left these behind just in case.

¹⁰ True enough, after long deliberation of the question, the Western powers, as well as the Soviet Union decided not to object to the participation of the VdU (Union of Independents) in the 1949 elections and their use of pan-German propaganda for winning over pro-Nazi Austrians who were given back their right to vote. The Social Democrats, prudently, also supported the new party hoping it would steal votes from the Christian Democrats. See Portisch and Riff, *op. cit.*

accepted the first if the Soviets gave up the second. Even so, the Americans found it hard to reconcile themselves to the idea of neutrality and dissuaded Austria from playing with this inflammatory word. They advised that Austria should not promise more than that it would not enter any military alliance and would not like to see alien troops on its territory because they, the Americans, would not want to keep arguing with the Soviets about what the United States or Austria did to violate that neutrality. Austria should also insist that the Austrian State Treaty did not extend to demilitarization. If it becomes absolutely necessary to declare neutrality, then Austria should do it as a state made sovereign by the Austrian State Treaty. The United States will not give guarantees, only secure Austria's borders which can be defined, at least.

The Soviet Union continued to demand various things (for instance, that Austria should not join the United Nations or any Western coalition), did a bit of blackmailing in calculating the price of the indemnification of German assets, but it was obvious that the most important issue for them was to link the German settlement with the Austrian (or, vice-versa), with the notion that they might be able to exact concessions from the Western powers. This created another deadlock, and the temporarily stationed troops stayed. The Americans augmented NATO with West Germany and the Soviets were toying with the idea of the Warsaw Pact. Khrushchev ousted Malenkov from power and suddenly said to Austria: forget yesterday, from now on the Soviet Union is ready to talk about the Austrian State Treaty independently of the German question. It was the time of the famous Moscow Meeting (Viennese politicians were strongly requested to appear in Moscow in the spring of 1955) which was to become the leitmotif of the foundation myth of the new Austrian state.

"We brought our liberty from Moscow." "Our dream of ten, seventeen, thirty-seven years has come true" (depending on where one begins to count). "We were hard as steel or bending like reed in sending 'negotiating' the Russians out of the Alps. What the West was unable to achieve, we accomplished (paid for)," said Austrian statesmen, like Julius Raab, Leopold Figl, Adolf Schärf, and state secretary of foreign affairs Bruno Kreisky, congratulating themselves. Among themselves they joked: "Finally, we have liberated ourselves from our

liberators." The Americans were quick to note the Soviet Union's hasty concessions at the bilateral negotiations. Moscow even offered Austria the opportunity to buy back the oil fields and the Danube Shipping Line which the Soviet Union had always considered strategically important, in return for a declaration of Swiss-type neutrality.¹¹ It was not neutrality in the ideological sense of the word, that is, the Soviet Union did not question Austria's Western orientation, and even ceased obstructing its admission into the United Nations. Lastly, just before signing the Austrian State Treaty, it consented to striking the, as it were, humiliating passage on joint responsibility for Nazism, and did not even set a ceiling on Austrian military strength.¹²

Why the rush? the West asked suspiciously. They did not abandon their Austrian friends even in Moscow (they were present during the bilateral negotiations, and they, too, consented to the clause on neutrality), so there was no danger of a secret clause being added. The West relaxed only when it became apparent that whatever ulterior motives the Soviet Union had (Khrushchev's opening toward peaceful coexistence, attempts to lure West Germany before its rearmament, to make money quickly, etc.), they were not very dangerous. West Germany was securely within the NATO, Trieste in Italian hands, and the Eastern bloc was crumbling since the Berlin uprising. After all, another buffer state beside Switzerland and Yugoslavia, would serve our own protection, the western powers thought. Perhaps the Soviet Union would also relax once the Warsaw Pact legitimized its presence in Central and Eastern Europe.

And for the first time in history, the Soviet Union showed real trust. They agreed to leave out the declaration of neutrality from the Austrian State Treaty, withdrew their troops within a few months, and gave the Austrian government the opportunity to make the pledge of

¹¹ Although, at the end of the war Austria rapidly nationalized German and Germanized enterprises to avoid their legal acquisition by the Russians (and thus invented the concept of anti-Soviet nationalization), in the end it could, at best, pay compensation for its own possessions.

¹² Everyone was happy, except Adenauer, who fiercely protested nationalization and compensation for German assets. Dismissal of joint responsibility for Nazism did not improve Austria's image in German minds.

neutrality in full possession of liberty, after the euphoria of independence had subsided. These few sentences, which were refined in the months between May and October 1955 became part of the Constitution¹³ and, more important, interpretative comments were also formulated by the government during this period. There was a need for the attributes of neutrality to be defined with utmost care, because "only" the following were settled during negotiations with the former Allied Powers: Austria shall not enter any military alliance in the future; shall not permit establishment of foreign bases on its territory; shall defend its neutrality by every means. Instead of the simple attributive "permanent" interpretation of the Constitution confirms the "perpetual" (*immerwährend*) nature of Austrian neutrality. It also confirms that this neutrality is (a) voluntary, not imposed, that is, Austria was not neutralized; (b) armed (*bewaffnet*) even if only for the purpose of self-defense, that is, the country was not demilitarized; (c) not ideological, but expressly military in meaning, that is, there is no economic, political, and cultural neutrality (or keeping equal distance from the blocs) and the state declaration of neutrality does not restrict the individual in exercising human and civil rights; (d) even in peacetime, neutrality presupposes active, constructive, war-avoiding behavior, that is, in colloquial terms, "we'll behave, just leave us alone."

This was when the legal dogmatic dispute and foreign policy maneuvering (or, somewhat maliciously, shuttlecock policy) began on the part of Austria. Pacifying gestures, omniscient explanations, let Austria decide what was and what was not covered by the concept of neutrality. Meanwhile, the apologetic Austrian position would become crystallized at the same time as practice softened to the

¹³ In the words of the Constitution: "(1) For the purpose of the permanent maintenance of her external independence and for the purpose of the inviolability of her territory, Austria of her own free will declares herewith her permanent neutrality which she is resolved to maintain and defend with all means at her disposal. (2) In order to secure these purposes Austria never in the future accede to any military alliance nor permit the establishment of military bases of foreign states on her territory." (Federal Constitutional Law of 26 October 1955 on the Neutrality of Austria, *Symbol 59/f*, Article 1.)

¹⁴ The South Tyrol question, Austria's most complicated neighbor squabble to-date, is hard to classify in this respect, since Austria's sovereignty (more exactly, the sovereignty of Austrians living across the border) is restricted by Italy, a NATO member state. It even blocked Austria's overtures to the Common Market in the sixties.

¹⁵ The description was used by the Social Democratic Vice Chancellor Bruno Pittermann in the fifties. The exact term was "starve to death."

Soviet Union's disadvantage. A survey of the events of the four decades after the Austrian State Treaty was ratified shows the following balance in "neutrality affairs": Austria gained admission to the United Nations, EFTA, the Council of Europe, it reached an agreement with the Common Market and, after many years, after the EEC became the European Union it became a member; in contrast, the Soviet Union has only one thing to be proud of (if we consider formal institutions), namely, that Austria joined the Danube Commission at the end of the fifties, and there were two lasting "refusals": Austria did not join the institutions of European integration until 1995; it is still kept out of/keeps away from NATO, and; at most, flirts with the idea of Partnership for Peace.¹⁴ It is a fact that Austrian neutrality was very profitable for its Eastern "liberator" (from diplomatic mediations, through the tolerance of international espionage and evasion of technological transfer prohibitions, to the undisturbed arrangement of intervention in 1956 and 1968), yet it was unable to enlist Austria among the non-aligned states. Austria was an observer, since anti-imperialism held no attractions for her, nor did it want to be identified with the Third World.

Austria acted friendly with everyone, knowing that the Soviets and the West alike were watching Argus-eyed, and if it did not want to "die of neutrality" it had to find loopholes and the means of self-justification that would satisfy both sides. Deep down, the Soviet Union was afraid of NATO expansion in Austria and accused the successive Austrian governments of a "cold *Anschluss*." The United States, on its part, suspected Austria of being too keen on its role as an "active neutral nation," overdoing it, almost sounding like a member of the "peace camp." But let us not rush ahead.

Precarious Sovereignty

State form: democracy. Austria has a government nurtured by the people and a people tortured by the government. In addition, Austria is forever neutral and 'forever' in Austria means as long as it is allowed.

Peter Orthofer

What was the price of new state sovereignty aside from pledging neutrality? The declaration of perpetual neutrality, when dictated, is not a glorifying act for a sovereign state even if—let us assume for the moment—it was the desired goal. What were the concrete obligations involved? The prohibition of *Anschluss* could hardly have bothered Austria, nor the—by now rather absurd—preclusion of any agreement with Germany (which one?), that would have prepared the way to an eventual union (theoretically, every Common Market agreement was of this type).¹⁶ By 1955, Austria had carried out a sort of de-Nazification to comply with the stipulation of the Austrian State Treaty, and no one expected it to begin the purges again; the regulations banning neo-fascism had also been enacted long before. Upholding the dethronement of the Habsburgs, as demanded by the Allied Powers, has always been the principal constitutional requisite serving the interests of the Second Republic. As to the rule that German citizens could not thenceforth serve in the (at the time) non-existent Austrian military—well, so much the better; the Austrian State Treaty specified the rank above which ex-Nazis could not serve in the military (I liked the ban on fascist propaganda screenplay writers the best); the country was not allowed to buy German and Japanese (civilian!) aircraft; it had to tend the memorials and cemeteries of the Allies. Bagatelle.

¹⁶ Union with East Germany, had it survived after 1989, would have been an interesting—though legally inconsistent—historical turn. Austria, which had traditionally close business relations with East Germany, which had recognized it when it was established and mourned a little when it ceased to exist (R. Münz, "Grüner Pfeil, blauer Helm, weisser Fleck: Nachrichten aus dem neuen Deutschland, Mit einem Seitenblick auf Österreich," *Transit* 10 (1995).

The issue of the redemption of German assets (which the West generously disregarded) was more unpleasant though it affected the spirit of the nation less than its pocket. Every country is free to run into debt without necessarily incurring a restriction on sovereignty. Yet it is not a pleasant thought that the collector may come with tanks. The proudly proclaimed "armed neutrality" seems more like the case of a little boy whistling in the dark. The fact is that the Austrian State Treaty prohibited the production and deployment of nuclear weapons, heavy artillery (with a range of over 18 miles, for instance), and bombers. I do not think that the prohibition on having submarines injured Austria's self-esteem, but the ban on missiles (even defensive missiles) might have. Interestingly enough, Great Britain, remembering its experience during the war, insisted on the inclusion of this clause. Austria was forced to destroy even the designs of the banned weapons. Moreover, the Allies reserved the right to prevent the deployment of any newly developed weapon in the region between the Neusiedler (Fertő) and Constance (Boden) lakes.

The Allied Powers kept their eyes on Austrian generals. The size of the army to be established was never officially limited but, miraculously, to-date it has never exceeded 50–60,000 men (the original concept specified an army of 53,000 men and an air force of 5,000). In the absence of surface-to-air missiles, Austrian airspace was wide open (and the cosignatories of the Austrian State Treaty flew in and out at will; for instance, a Soviet military air-freighter in 1968), which made the Austrian military command think about proclaiming some of the large settlements "open cities." The former allies also kept track of what weapons the other was offering for sale. Thus Austria was better off producing its own arms or acquiring them from neutral Switzerland or Sweden if it wanted to develop its military. And it had little choice, since at the outset the *Bundesheer* (federal army) had only second-hand (primarily Western-made) weapons left over from the war.¹⁷

It is a fact that in 1955 foreign troops left the country in haste (the four elephants got off the boat, the locals said), and ever since a doc-

¹⁷ See Ermacora, op. cit.; Portisch and Riff, op. cit.; E. Reiter, "Die Neutralität ist kein sicherheitspolitisches Konzept der Zukunft," in Krejci, Reiter, and Schneider, eds., op. cit.; Rotter, op. cit.

ument signed by the victor powers guarantees Austria's boundaries. Moreover, it is perhaps not a negligible fact that thenceforth the government of this sovereign republic was responsible exclusively to the Parliament rather than the Allied Council. It feels different to know that instead of foreign troops, government members hunt in the Alps; that the state president once again has the right to grant amnesty. This was not an easy period for Austria, however. Unquestionably, its sovereignty was dictated, rationed out, a kind of gift which may be filled with content and reinforced from the inside, though obviously the means of doing so were also considerably restricted. There was no military offensive capability to strengthen this shield of sovereignty, and a victorious repossession of South Tirol was out of question, as was a possible campaign to take, for example, the city of Sopron on the Hungarian border. Instead, the Austrian State Treaty prescribed what ethnic groups (Slovenes, Croats) Austria must live in peaceful coexistence with inside its borders.

What cannot be accomplished by force, diplomats and businessmen will accomplish, given enough self-confidence. If two adversaries keep you in check, play one off against the other. If you must give in, hold up your head and do as if it were what you always wanted and prepare a new tactic. Make a virtue of necessity. Do not forget your hinterland and take care conflict does not arise there. Reading the memoirs of the great generation of Austrian political elite¹⁸ shows these to have been the—somewhat old-fashioned—recipes they learned from the skirmishes preceding the Austrian State Treaty. They did not leave much to chance, though they could have, since luck was on their side.

Hinterland? It was more like "a hinter-nation". Under Hitler the National Socialists (Germans and Austrians) argued that the principle of *ein Volk in zwei Staaten* (one people in two states) violated the national sovereignty of the Germanic peoples. According to them, the *Anschluss* ended this violation forever, though Austria did lose its

¹⁸ See K. Gruber, *Ein politisches Leben* (Vienna, 1976); Bruno Kreisky, *Zwischen den Zeiten* (Vienna, 1986); Bruno Kreisky, *Im Strom der Politik* (Vienna, 1988); J. Raab, *Ich glaube an Österreich* (Vienna, 1995); A. Schärf, *Österreichs Erneuerung: 1945–1955* (Vienna, 1955).

sovereignty in the process, but who was going to mourn for it? Well, there was plenty of tears between 1945 and 1955 until the State Treaty returned a large part of its independence, thereby giving Austria a historic opportunity to accomplish what the First Republic could not. Namely, to turn state sovereignty into national sovereignty, to establish a nation-state in the middle of the twentieth century with considerable delay, indeed to invest the *Staatsnation* with the attributes of *Kulturnation*, and thereby strengthen and internalize state sovereignty. Every single one of the thirty years after 1955 was in favor of this and so Austria remained a united whole. Germany, on the other hand, was divided; its eastern half attempted the same trick to create sovereignty under incomparably worse conditions and much more clumsily. The western half had a guilty conscience because of Hitlerism and/or was arrogant enough not to trust the success of the Austrian *Kulturnation*. So West Germany did not intervene.

The Austrian State Treaty ensured greater state sovereignty than national legitimacy. The country had to derive its legitimacy from its own (if possible, pure) sources. What is an Austrian if not a German? Until 1918, the answer to this question, inescapable since nineteenth-century German unification, was: a Habsburg subject; between 1918 and 1945 the answer was this: an Alpine ("better") German; by 1955, what could be said was void of dignity: an Austrian is a German whom the Allied Powers do not consider German (or do not label a Nazi out of kindness, but insincerely). This sorry opening could have served as grounds for self-pity in playing the part of a small-state victim licking its wounds until the end of eternity, but there was also a forward way out. After a few years of some thinking and much work it was possible to imagine an Austria inhabited by Austrians and defined by Austrians. The somewhat insecure Austrian sovereignty was buttressed with new pillars of national identity and after a while the Austrians believed that the independence they were once given was complete and theirs forever, in fact they had deserved it, they had actually fought for it. Maybe this was the real Austrian Miracle.

Identity in the Golden Age

Today, if someone asks an Austrian in England:

Are you German? most say: No, I am an Austrian.

Fifty or sixty years ago the answer would have been a great deal more complicated, something like this:

Yes but from Austria. Or: I am a German-Austrian.

Gerald Stourzh

Let us forget the darker side of national identity for the moment, since Austrians, too, tried to talk about it as little as possible, putting their faith in the liberating effect of repression—and making Sigmund Freud turn in his grave. Let us take the Austrian novelties of evolving national identification (self-deception) in the fifties, sixties, and the seventies. Although some of these ideas were already present in post-war (also prewar) political discourse, the work of elaborating them and their official synthesis was done in the Kreisky era. Briefly, and ignoring the order of importance, they are the following:

I. Austria was Hitler's first victim. The Moscow declaration of 1943 in which the Allies acquitted Austria of joint responsibility, in addition to easing reparations, also greatly eased the country's feelings of guilt. In the spirit of the declaration, the raving crowds on the Heldenplatz in Vienna greeting Hitler's entry into Austria in 1938, the 99.73% result of the plebiscite in support of the *Anschluss* (even if we know how such data come about), the many concentration camps, the Austrians joining the SS, the Austrian origins of Kaltenbrunner, Eichmann and others, the entire history of Austro-fascism, and, of course, the German nationalism of Austrian Social Democrats, were all forgettable and to be forgotten.¹⁹

¹⁹ In 1918, Karl Renner, the first interim chancellor of the First Republic, proclaimed German Austria and even wrote its national anthem; in the twenties and the thirties, as a moderate Social Democrat, he sought cooperation with the Christian Democrats; in 1938 he voted in favor of the *Anschluss*, as he put it, "happily"; in 1944, he wrote a letter to Stalin discussing the future of socialism in Austria (and also mentioned that he had met Stalin's comrades-in-arms, Lenin and Trotsky [!]), and finally, he became the first president of the Second Republic trying to free itself of its German past. This "master builder of two republics" is rightly considered the symbol of Austrian continuity in the twentieth century.

Anyone who did not wish to remember asked: let's have a look at the dictionary and see since when does *Anschluss* mean only joining (perhaps even volunteering) and not territorial annexation?²⁰ How about the great many anti-fascists of the Austrian resistance, should they be forgotten? If the Germans occupied Austria, how could Austria be held responsible for war crimes?²¹

These were the first building blocks of national solidarity after the war. The surviving Social and Christian Democratic leaders said: We bitterly blame ourselves only for forming rival political camps in the thirties, seeking to destroy each other, instead of fighting fascism. But these camps disappeared in the concentration camps. In Dachau we learned to respect social peace forever. We continue to fight old and neo-fascists: ours is perhaps the most stringent law in Europe prohibiting a recurrence of Nazi crimes (*Wiederbetätigung*),²² and we have Simon Wiesenthal, the merciless hunter of Nazis. Soviet Jews emigrate via Vienna. Our banner, coat-of-arms, our national anthem are innocent.²³

²⁰ It is no accident that in 1989 the official term for German reunification was *Zusammenschluss* expressing reciprocal will, which in 1938 was still used interchangeably with *Anschluss*.

²¹ The fundamentally Communist and Catholic organized resistance did good service in showing Austria as a victim after the war. It was Waldheim who destroyed this myth before the world when he said that he was (only) doing his duty together with hundreds of thousands of his compatriots. See Walter Manoschek's article in Sieder, Steinert, and Tálos, eds., op. cit., and Gerhard Botz, Hans Saffrian, and Walter Manoschek in Botz and Sprengnagel, eds., op. cit., as well as Anton Pelinka's study in Mantl, ed., op. cit.

²² It was a strange example of law interpretation when at the end of the eighties a representative of the Green Party carried a Nazi flag into the Parliament to protest. Waldheim and was warned that the use of Nazi symbols was prohibited by law.

²³ Already in 1919, against Social Democratic opposition the Babenberg banner of red, white, and red won over the German black, red, and gold tricolor which, after the war, hoped to symbolize the affinity to Germany, the traditions of 1848, and the break from the Habsburg age. The present coat-of-arms of the country was also created by the First Republic: one-headed eagle with the Mauerkrone on its head, holding a sickle and a hammer in its claws to express the unity of the three social orders: the bourgeoisie, the workers, and the peasants (note, this is not the communist symbol). In 1945, at Renner's proposal, a broken chain was added to indicate Austria's liberation from fascism. The eagle is not two-headed but discreetly carries the German colors to date. The

What about the fact that justice was served with the execution of a few dozen war criminals and that already in the 1949 elections parties were competing for the votes of ex-Nazis who, until then, were denied civil rights? What about the fact that Austria forgot to compensate the few survivors of the Holocaust (a German problem, it was said, and they were left out of the State Treaty)? What about the fact that the word *Kzler* meaning camp resident was an expression of contempt for a long time after the war? What about the fact that the new Austrian army invited Wehrmacht officers into its ranks? What about the fact that in 1949 a pan-German party (the legal predecessor of Haider's FPÖ today), at times showing strong Nazi sympathies, was reestablished? What about the fact that the *Turnerbund* and various ultrarightist fraternities were permitted to organize again?²⁴ What about the fact that not until the mid-eighties—and under external pressure—was it discovered what Waldheim did during the war. Well, let's relegate these facts to the subconscious!

2. *Austria is a German-speaking but a non-German (non-Prussian) country, deserving the same recognition in the community of nations as the two Germanies or Switzerland.* It is not one of the German states but itself a republic of federative *Lands*. It is smaller but not inferior. Moreover, it had legal continuity: it has been called *Ostarrichi* thousand years ago, its historical predecessor is the Habsburg, and not the Holy Roman Empire; Francis Joseph I, and not Wilhelm II; the First Republic, and not the Weimar Republic. Let us forget the Austrian feelings of inferiority accumulating—and what is

story of the national anthem is even more circuitous. After a brief hiatus, Haydn's composition, the "*Gott erhalte*," was the anthem of the First Republic with words expressing pro-German sentiments and which was later rephrased and became known as "*Deutschland, Deutschland über alles*" to the same melody. After the war the Christian Democrats tried to save the melody by softening its military, march-like structure, but were voted down in 1947. (After it became known that the Germans do not want to return the "annexed" music either.) The music of the finally accepted anthem based on a tune allegedly by Mozart and a competition decided on the text which describes the natural beauties of Austria. See Breuss, Liebhart, and Pribersky, op. cit.; Menasse, *Das Land ohne Eigenschaft*.

²⁴ See H. H. Scharsach, *Haider's Clan: Wie Gewalt entsteht* (Vienna: 1995).

worse, probably justified—since the German unification and the defeat at Königgrätz in 1866, the Austrian plans for constitutional modification concerning the establishment of German Austria (Deutsch-Österreich),²⁵ and the insatiable desire of certain provinces (primarily Salzburg and Tirol) between the wars, but before the *Anschluss*, to join Big Brother. Moreover, let Austria create its independent culture (and maybe language) by setting up Austrian Cultural Institutes beside the world-wide network of the (German) Goethe Institutes and by dubbing German movies (or at least commercials). Austria is not Europe's China as (the German) Karl Marx contemptuously called it, nor is it the place where the Balkans begin as liberal Germans had always jeered because of its feudal sympathies, bigoted religiousness, and gut-level *étatisme* (cf. *Obrigkeitsstaat*). Beethoven was Austrian, Hitler was German—it has been said maliciously that this switch of nationality has been the basis of the Austrian *Kultur* nation ideal since the fifties.

3. *The authentic model of "social partnership" (Sozialpartnerschaft) guarantees the Austrian Miracle.* It is a kind of social market economy like its German counterpart, but more charitable, less market-oriented, more agreeable and nature-friendly. The welfare state, a carefully nurtured hybrid of Christian social teachings and the traditions of "Red Vienna," flourishes in the two- (more exactly, two and a half) party democracy. A coalition of "black" and "red," Christian and Social Democrats governs the country together with corporations they control (or which control them), and tames the class struggle to accommodate parity committee negotiations. The time lost in strikes is measured in minutes (on an annual basis), welfare benefits are increasingly more generous. The social peace dreamt about in concentration camps has been realized and although political camps still

²⁵ Negotiations on the question of unification were so far advanced that Vienna was almost named the second capital of Germany. However, the victorious Western powers intervened and the country was named *Republik Österreich* instead of the commonly considered South East Germany, Higher Germany, Danube Germany, etc. (Renner's favorite was *Republik der Deutschen Alpenlande*.) In consolation, Austria was allowed to retain German as the state language and the German tricolor in its coat-of-arms. See Stourzh, op. cit.

exist, they cooperate. When the Christian Democrats were squeezed out of the coalition (between 1970 and 1986), the Socialists continued where the coalition left off. They are called "red," but actually they are hardly even pink. They refuse to have anything to do with communists and keep only the "Austro" from their former Austro-Marxism. The clericalism of "blacks" is also slowly disappearing and their agrarian sympathies are diminishing. Both camps tend toward the social-liberal center. The ongoing chaos of the period between the two world wars has been replaced by political stability—the elite has learned the lessons of history.

What is to be forgotten amid all this positiveness? The party game mocked by the names of *Proporzsystem* and *Parteibuchwirtschaft*, the state divided and used by the two parties (the SPÖVP Union Party, as Jörg Haider called them), on the basis of "I scratch your back, you scratch mine," corruption, waste, and impotence, the decline of parliamentarism into corporatism, indeed, a corporatism not regulated by law, excessive state intervention in the economy, cronyism, nepotism, authoritarianism, the weakness of civil society. *Kammerstaat* and *Beamterstaat* (chamber state and state of bureaucrats). A republic without republicans (real liberals). The western-eastern slope in the political culture of the country. The traditional opposition between the conservative "Alpine" Austrians and the more socialist-liberal "Danubian" Austrians.

4. *Austria is becoming increasingly rich*, leaving behind not only its eastern neighbors (including East Germany), but also catching up and, in many respects, overtaking the more advanced states in Europe (including West Germany) and the world. In spite of fears following 1918, Austria, a small country, is proving vigorous indeed. An undying merit of the Austrian Miracle is that rapid economic growth matched increasing social equality, the state matched the market, employer the employee. Domestic small and medium enterprises developed together with mammoth (including foreign) enterprises, Alpine agriculture with urban industry and tourism; meanwhile, territorial distribution of growth improved and environmental protection was exemplary. Austria did not turn inward, but followed and often overtook international trends, for instance, in the development of small enterprises, services, and pollution control, as well as in human capital investment. Forgotten was the first push given by the Marshall

Plan; the European (German) hinterland; the inflow of German capital, the undeclared currency union with West Germany; the informal "COMECON membership;" the wasteful big state industries and pumping of subsidies into agriculture; the overregulated domestic market; the backwardness of Burgenland, etc.

5. *Austria is a small Central European mediator* (bridge, turntable), which participates in international life in beyond its size. Here, again, Central Europe is the keyword to distinguish Austria from Germany and denote the country easternmost West, and not westernmost East, as some might think. The memory of the Monarchy shines through this notion: accordingly, Austria, though not the military power it once was, is economically and culturally a small-scale regional great power amid perhaps the most liberal iron curtain states which were forced to adopt communism yet preserved common traditions. For this reason and because its neighbors are "only" Warsaw Pact countries but not the Soviet Union, no one should dare compare it to Finland (Austria is not a subcase of Finlandization), though it, too, maintains very friendly relations with the Soviets. Like and in competition with Switzerland, Austria attracts international economic and political institutions (OPEC, UNIDO, Atomic Energy Commission, etc.), as well as informal networks. It mediates not only between East and West (Helsinki process), but also between the advanced and developing worlds, especially the Middle East. There is order within its close environment it manages to solve even the most sensitive issues (South Tirol, Carinthian Slovenes), and when political refugees from the East knock on its doors (1956, 1968, 1981), they are admitted, and relations with Hungary are an ideal example of neighborliness.

Central Europe means Europe but never Eastern Europe. Austria moves toward Western Europe with deliberate steps: for reasons of neutrality it chooses the less tightly woven EFTA instead of the Common Market, then builds a bridge between the two organizations, trades freely but does not integrate. As the home of the Pan-European movement and a neutral country, it favors a united Europe without blocs. Until that time, it remains Atlantist in spirit—though it is not part of the NATO military structure—and a member of the developed (free) world. At the same time, being a neutral small state which never

possessed any colonies overseas and is not hampered by geostrategic considerations, it shows greater understanding for the problems of the developing countries than the great powers. Let there be no misunderstanding: Austria is not a part but a custodian of the Third World. In Hugo von Hofmannstahl's words: Austria is on the receiving end in relation to the North and the West, and on the giving end in relation to the South and the East.

Things to be forgotten: Germany and Italy are also Central European; the mythical elements of the concept of Central Europe; the resistance of the Common Market to Austria's admission; the small violations of neutrality; the developing states are a business venturereas well; Austria is a messenger, not an independent mediator, etc.

6. *Austria is a real (multi)cultural great power with jovial citizens, an island of peace and happiness* (Insel der Seligen).²⁶ It is a country with an imperial history, cultural world heritage, untouched nature, of Habsburgs, Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, Franz Joseph Haydn, and Beethoven, and also—as the anthem says—a country of mountains, valleys, and rivers, inhabited by convivial (*gemütlich*), life-loving people who exude the air of *Ostcharme mit Westkomfort*. Low crime rate, intact families, though the rate of suicide may be a bit high. The Republic is proud of the historical mixing of peoples on its territory (this, among others, predestines it for independence amid the Germanic peoples), of being a nation that is inclusive rather than exclusive. The Republic is proud of its aristocrats, though—officially—it does not allow the use of titles. The Viennese cookbook is full of Hungarian and Czech/Slovak recipes, the operetta is full of fun-loving Hungarian hussar officers, the arts and sciences are (until the end of the thirties) full of Jews. If German kinship must be mentioned, then the vivacious Bavarians are the link, they are the French of Germany, the main Catholics, who—to say something about folk culture—also wear Lederhosen and like Schrammel music.

Everyone fits into the common history. Theodor Herzl, Franz Kafka, and Sigmund Freud, but also Karl Lueger and Engelbert Dollfuss, all the Social Democratic and Christian Democratic leaders

and their lieutenants, every Habsburg, except those living, but even they are being slowly accepted. It is better not to mention Hitler's Austrian origins. Let us not pry into popular anti-Semitism, with or without the Jews, or the traditional and general contempt for the neighboring peoples, primarily the Yugoslavs (derisively called *Tschusch*) and, to a degree, the Italians, nor into the periodic hatred of Germans depicted as Prussians (*Piefkes*) and the aversion to the Swiss. Let us not ask whether Austrian literature is German, nor why German, Swiss, and Austrian television broadcast Musikantenstadl at the same time every month. Might there be an all-German folklore after all and, God forbid, an all-German people?

Let us stay with the joy of life. The Blue Danube Waltz is just as much part of the Austrian image of *savoir vivre* as Wienerschnitzel, the Wiener Sängerknaben just as much as the Sacher cake, Mozart just as much as the Mozart Kugeln. The spectacular Viennese Spanish Riding School, Schönbrunn, and the Opera Ball are blended with the charms of "the Styrian oak" Arnold Schwarzenegger, Sissi (the affectionate name for Elisabeth, the wife of Austria's Emperor Francis Joseph I) and Kaiserschmarrn (a kind of dessert), Jugendstil and the Prater, Stephansdom and Heuriger stand together. So does Baroque and the yodel. Austrians are a little old-fashioned, but not museum pieces. They are not boring and rigidly upright; being decent (anständig) does not exclude being resourceful and a little slipshod.

The above constituents of Austrian identity—characterizing the golden age of the 1970s, early 1980s—obviously overlap, and frequent repetition only reinforces this mix. This is especially true if we consider that not only statesmen and political pamphleteers worked on it, not only "red" and "black" leading intellectuals strengthened the faith of Austrians who were eager—and who is to blame them?—to associate their self-image with something morally superior (and more successful) than the image of war criminals, but everyday experience and the outside world also seemed to justify this massive success propaganda (also shaped by the professional state advertising agency, the *Österreich-Werbung*).²⁷

²⁶ Pope Paul VI's description of Austria.

²⁷ The first postwar official Austria image was presented by E. Marboe, *Das Österreichbuch* (Vienna, 1948).

In American and Soviet war movies the Nazis were Germans, not Austrians; world television news showed Bruno Kreisky happily embracing Josip Broz Tito and Yasser Arafat; John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev shook hands in Vienna; Waldheim was two-term United Nations Secretary General. Wherever Austrians went in the world, they could do so with heads held high, they were liked and acknowledged, and could return home feeling "we count," "we are small but strong," and "there is no place like home."

An experienced Hungarian will soon discover in the above identity elements of the traditional Central European small-state some traces of the odd sense of pride in "we are different/better," "we are in between," "we are a little ambivalent." This is the special Austrian way (*Sonderfall Österreich*), as they liked to say. Nevertheless—for the first time since the disintegration of the Monarchy (except for the attempt at Austro-fascism)²⁸—self-interpretations contain not a sense of defeat, guilty conscience, bitter self-pity, or resignation. There is no longing for old fame, no sense of ill-fate. The self-portrait of Austria is not one of a country caught between shores, eroded by permanent internal conflicts, not a frontier fortress of the West under siege, not a pawn pushed to and fro on the chessboard of nations. Instead—and please excuse the profane simile—Austria is the tail that wags the dog: it shows the door to the occupying powers, creates its own state philosophy and social organization, entrusts itself with international mediation. Meanwhile, harmony rages in the country. It seems as if the "god of the Austrians" were reading some American pop psychology book before starting creation, the key phrase being: think positive. The people react well: every survey shows that they feel great and increasingly Austrian in the new roles they play.

²⁸ Austro-fascism or clerical authoritarianism? Was Dollfuss the harbinger of Nazism or the champion of "state resistance"? Was it the original model experiment of corporatist organization or an Austrian variant of national socialism? Is it a new Austrian national consciousness or a conviction that "Austrians are better than Germans"? The dispute about Dollfuss, Schuschnigg, and their ideological associates still continues. See Gottfried-Karl Kindermann and Karl Dietrich Bracher in Botz and Sprengnagel, eds., op. cit.

Mock them as we might, by the end of the seventies Austrians convinced themselves that basically all was well. It was easy, especially since basically all was really well, and the resultant surprisingly homogeneous national consciousness made things even better. The difference between provincial, ethnic, and political camp identities lessened, and decision through consensus became dominant. The concept of nation made use of relatively few atavistic symbols, it was not very historicising, and incorporated a set of new myths, some of which were based on pragmatic motives, for instance, neutrality. Kreisky, or Emperor Bruno as he was fondly or mockingly called, represented the return of *gloire* (I mean, *Glanz*) to Cis-Leithania. Is it possible that finally the Austrian state truly became a nation? In any event, October 26, the day neutrality was proclaimed and which was called the Day of the Flag for ten years, was renamed the National Holiday (*Nationalfeiertag*) in 1965. Thenceforth neutrality deserved special mention (if not the first in order) in the enumeration of the fundamental elements of national identity.²⁹

There were many things the shapers of national identity had to overcome. Almost everyone at the time considered the First Republic a temporary formation. The Central European curse also afflicting Austria was that, generally, patriots were not republicans and republicans were not patriots. Dollfuss' clerical-nationalist program was stillborn. The persistent Germanophile sentiments of the social democrats (socialism together with the more advanced brother) enabled the communists—also ordered by the Comintern—to discover the "thousand-year-old" Austrian nation together with the Christian Democrats and the legitimists, of course, and against the Germans. It was based on traditional opposition between Prussia and Austria complemented by some national characteristics, to expose German nati-

²⁹ See Bruckmüller in Mantl, ed., op. cit.; Bruckmüller, Fellner, and Haas in Botz and Sprengnagel, eds., op. cit.; and also Breuss, Liebhart, and Pribersky, op. cit.; Bruckmüller, op. cit.; M. Gehler and R. Steininger, eds., *Österreich und die europäische Integration 1945–1993, Aspekte einer wechselseitigen Entwicklung* (Vienna, 1993); F. Plasser and P. A. Ullram, *Österreichbewusstsein und nationale Identität. Ein empirischer Forschungsbericht* (Vienna, 1991).

ness. The result was a counter-identity: albeit the Christian Democrats laid greater emphasis on the Catholicism of Austrians than the communists, they agreed that as a race (!) their people differ from the Germans due to the great Danubian mix of ethnic groups. With some exaggeration, the anti-Semitic line was handy and only the word "German" had to substituted for "Jew." And, of course, another language called "hurdistanisch" had to be introduced in schools, which was German, of course, but was known as the "school language" for years after the war under the cultural ministership of the conservative Felix Hurdes. It became (and still is) fashionable to speak in various local dialects instead of *Hochdeutsch*. If Hitler had only known how well he united the Austrian nation!³⁰

Gradually, the Social Democrats also came on board, especially when they formed the government by themselves. Kreisky's rival, Josef Klaus, pictured on the 1970 ÖVP election posters as the "true Austrian," (against the Austrian Jew Kreisky) nevertheless suffered defeat, and the winner started stressing how Austrian he was. He linked the concept of nation with modernization and openness, on the one hand, and subtly rehabilitated the Habsburgs, taunted the Germans (while the economies of the two countries became meshed in an unprecedented way), the Israeli, and the Americans, and lectured the Russians, on the other. He did not believe too much in the traditions of Austrian federalism, and planned to raise strong national identity to replace provincial identities. The Austrian Economic Miracle helped accomplish this. Four Austrian competitors in the first three places, roared a television reporter.³¹

All noteworthy surveys up to the second half of the eighties show that Austrians increasingly looked on their state as a nation. In the

³⁰ See Fellner and Haas in Botz and Sprengnagel, eds., op. cit.; Gerhard Botz and Albert Müller in E. Gehmacher, "Europa nur für Gewinner? Die Meinungsbildung um EWR und EG in Österreich," in Krejci, Reiter, and Schneider, eds., op. cit.

³¹ See Hans Eder in Sieder, Steinert, and Tálos, eds., op. cit.; Ernst Bruckmüller's article in Mantl, ed., op. cit., and P. Gerlich, ed., *Sozialpartnerschaft in der Krise: Leistungen und Grenzen des Neokorporatismus in Österreich* (Vienna, 1985).

mid-fifties nearly half of the respondents considered Austria to be part of the German *Kulturnation*. In three decades this declined to one-fifth. The less educated and the younger the respondents, the more they believed themselves to be Austrians. They did not derive the nation from the state or the constitution, they did not call it a homeland, they had no particularly romantic notions about it. *Heimat* was the immediate locality, the province, especially in Carinthia, Tirol, and Vorarlberg. Based on these observations, the majority of Austrian historians in the eighties rejected the German theory of "three German states, two nations, and one people" in their own *Historikerstreit*. Austria is not only an independent state, but also a *Kulturnation*, therefore, how could it belong to a one and only German people?—they asked.³²

Sitting on the Fence

Assuming that Austria's neutrality is as perfectly voluntary as some say, the question remains: is it possible to ask a nation to pay taxes, serve in the army, obey the law, respect the national banner, all of which give evidence of and symbolize what the nation should not do. Restrictions imposed on a community can hardly constitute its essence unless we are talking about a penitentiary.

Thomas O. Schlesinger

How much of the sheen of the above success attributes of national self-identification is reflected in sovereignty? Let us take the example of the interpretation of neutrality again. For decades, Austria has been demonstrating how the dogmatically consistent (originally Swiss) concept of neutrality can be tempered—almost imperceptibly—so that it does not impede the development of the Austrian Model and curtail the flight of political imagination. This is how its

³² Botz and Sprengnagel offer a good review on the main stages of the debate. With the exception of Fritz Fellner, the better-known historians of modern Austria—Ardelt, Botz, Csáky, Hanisch, Rumpel Stourzh, and Weinzierl—launched a joint attack against the introductory study by Karl Dietrich Erdmann. Botz and Sprengnagel, eds., op. cit.

leaders wanted to avoid a tragicomic ending wherein the celebrated neutrality which was to serve sovereignty would preclude strengthening the other pillars of sovereignty.

Meanwhile, Switzerland was mentioned with diminishing frequency. Unlike its alleged example, Austria joined the United Nations immediately upon signing the Austrian State Treaty in 1955 risking that, though a neutral country, it would have to obey binding resolutions (e.g., war sanctions) adopted without its consent. Since the beginning of its membership it has been busy issuing statements on the conditions under which it would have to refrain from carrying out United Nations resolutions. In 1956, Austria stood by watching as the Soviet Union overran a neighboring state which had just declared itself neutral. From the early sixties it aspired to join the Common Market, which would have also entailed consequences that violate, indeed rule out neutrality, for instance, in case a member state, with which Austria maintains close economic ties, enters war. Not to mention the expected political solidarity. Austria wanted the benefits of membership without its disadvantages, to be inside as well as outside. In the words of the British ambassador in Vienna, Austria wanted to sit on top of the fence while others did the dirty work. The West was becoming suspicious, so it was time to formulate a flexible interpretation of neutrality in order to dispel the misgiving that the country might be trying to take a free ride. How can a policy be morally vindicated which allows the Communist-organized World Youth Rally and the rightist Sudeten Germans' meeting to take place in Vienna; which asks to share in the fruits of the Common Market while saying that, being a neutral country, it wants to be left out of certain economic warfare measures; which, when denied admission into the EEC, hints at being invited to join the COMECON; which makes moves to arm itself, yet expects to be protected.

What was there to say to all this? Be offended and ask: weren't you the ones who wanted it to be like this? Or retort by listing the advantages the West enjoyed as a result of the Austrian *Ostpolitik*? Or perhaps sing the words of the hymn of *Realpolitik*: "You try surviving in the shadow of the Iron Curtain." Or, could the people of a small tormented country rely on anything else but their resourcefulness? Others would do the same, western states do not always act in soli-

darity either. I would not say that the Austrian political elite missed these opportunities to score political points, but they considered it far more important to avoid portraying the concept of neutrality as a "necessary evil." Looking ahead and carefully nurturing the identity of its citizens, Austria began to explain how great it was to be neutral. This moral deficit had to be made to disappear especially since no plebiscite was held to authenticate the parliament's declaration of neutrality.

The cosmetic revision began when neutrality was declared. With the propagation of neutrality, Austria contributes to world peace and to eventual disarmament. Austria helps to smooth over international conflicts, admits refugees (would it have helped the Hungarians or Czechs had Austria provoked the Soviet Union, they reason), and is always ready for goodwill and humanitarian missions. It joined the United Nations, among others, because it felt it may be needed there. It hurries to Cyprus (to mediate between two NATO member states), to Egypt etc. to keep the peace. Austria liked to call itself parliamentarian (*ehrlicher Makler*) and medical orderly. This part of the neutrality doctrine was devised for public consumption.

In the field of international law, Austrian neutrality sought the broadest interpretation and the ensuing gray area allowed it to select convenient interpretations. The pledge of perpetual neutrality means neutrality in both peace and war. Proclamation of an active neutral policy means responsibility for the future consequences of decisions. Even though Austria is militarily neutral, it must know that a hermetic isolation of military affairs from the economy and politics is not possible. Bearing this in mind, Austrian politicians reasoned: let's talk as much about neutrality and about as many of its elements as possible but keep the options of interpretation under our control. After all, Austria is a sovereign state. The imposition of the Swiss model left it no other option; the concept could not be narrowed down to the maxims of "we shall not join any military alliance" and "we shall not allow foreign troops into the country." If Austria is to be neutral, let it be very neutral. What is there to risk? That the Soviets would object to Austrian officers watching American movies on television? There is more to win. The country can always reject their overtures saying, "sorry, our religion (i.e., neutrality does not allow it." As for the West,

it has made so many concessions already that Austria will manage somehow. In this respect, however, they miscalculated somewhat. It took over thirty years after the first attempts in the early sixties, after a long wait and humiliating rejections, not entirely due to the stubborn objections of the Soviet Union, to gain admission into the realm of the European Union. Furthermore, just like before the ratification of the State Treaty, geopolitical rearrangement was again necessary for Austria to become "interesting" again.

Yet Austria was also lucky. Discounting Soviet interventions, there was no serious military activity (war) in its vicinity. In the Security Council the two sides kept one another in check, and thus there were no United Nations resolutions adopted that would impose obligations violating Austria's neutrality until the Gulf War. Civil war did not erupt in South Tirol, and Austria also took care to make sure it would not. Furthermore, the fact that the traditional guidelines laid down in the 1907 Hague Convention on what a neutral country can and cannot do largely lost force, also worked in Austria's favor (can a missile fly over neutral airspace; what constitutes economic, psychological, information warfare; what happens if a war is waged without having been declared; does satellite intelligence gathering violate neutrality; etc.). It was easy to fish in troubled waters.

It was possible to vote now this way, now that in the United Nations, even in the Security Council (on Rhodesia, South Africa, Cyprus, Middle East), being flexible in interpreting the rule of impartiality, claiming that Austria was only representing "collectively neutral" United Nations resolutions. It was possible to say that there was no war in South Tirol and, therefore, the training of terrorists in Austria was irrelevant. Austria could ask who was to decide which of technologies it sold to the Eastern bloc were strategically important. Or, to declare that arms exports, if not sent to warring countries, is honest business. If I understand correctly, the distinction between the law of neutrality and the policy of neutrality provided the doctrinal justification for this reasoning.³³ Reputedly, the latter offers greater scope for free calculation of actions. Prudence was required only in

³³ See Ermacora, *op. cit.*

taking care that during these diplomatic sleights of hand neither the opposition nor the critical intellectuals become too bold, and that they do not strike a discourteous note in dealings with either military bloc. Although, when neutrality was proclaimed, it was also said that it imposes no obligations on the citizens, yet self-restraint was the main unwritten rule of conduct.³⁴ Let us do things our own way, Austrian politicians argued. We will escape the traps of neutrality gradually and quietly and thus extend the boundaries of sovereignty. The time was the late seventies, early eighties.

Virtual Sovereignty

Where there is a national soccer team and a National Bank, there must also be a nation.

Bruno Kreisky

What does all of the above say about sovereignty? Why do I consider this sovereignty to have been virtual? Let me say in advance that I use virtual in the original dual sense of the word and by no means pejoratively, that is, in the sense of "seeming." In Vienna this is called "real-fiction." This is how less sovereignty becomes more. It is not simply a case of a footman dressed like a king or an animal puffing itself up to appear larger. Austria did not just imagine its own importance. Although, in the fifties, it had very little to start out with on the road to self-construction but it was able to win the respect of its immediate and broader environment in excess to its strength. It would be unfair to call this contemptuously a pretence. If anyone, it deceived only itself insofar as it became perhaps too absorbed with self-construction as the years went by. According to the writer Robert Musil, the Austrians' sense of opportunity is more highly developed than their sense of reality.

³⁴ In 1968, during the Prague intervention, the head commissary of the ORF instructed his colleagues as follows: "In view of the unrestricted freedom of the press we enjoy, we must exercise utmost self-control. As the voice of free and neutral Austria we cannot be party to speculative journalism.... We must take utmost care especially in live programs.... Rather risk a discrediting technical breakdown than make irreparable political blunders." *Ibid.*, p. 253.

The (insecure) sovereignty, restored by the grace of the Allied Powers, and the neutrality Austria was talked into were in fact something very little to start with. But the Austrian State Treaty concealed a much greater scope of activity than expected. It soon became obvious that the East did not object to Austria's Western orientation, while the West tolerated flirtations with the East. Its busy activity between the two blocs, the performance of minor services in the role of mediator, as well as the acquisition of special expertise from Eastern Europe and building a complex network of contacts therein, helped Austria rise to the heights of world politics. When the East came too close for comfort (1956, 1968), the West protected Austria's sovereignty. When the West tried to exert its influence (EEC), the Austrians could always argue that the Soviets would not like it. When Austria talked about its role in building a bridge between East and West, it was actually to praise its enclave position. The country followed a similar strategy later in the dialogue between North and South, thus collecting credits from all points of the compass.

While politically guarding, economically it consolidated its sovereignty. Good-neighbor Austria supplemented its irrefutable domestic economic achievements with advantages obtained by playing the *Mitfahrer*, a guide and sometimes a free-rider, in East-West (then North-South) business relations. Technological transfers and trade in raw materials, re-exportation of commissioned work and transit traffic, financial services, capital exportation and tourism—a mediator or immediate beneficiary in all these spheres, Austria made profit at minimal political expense and without being under duress to compensate for economic losses. (For instance, it did not have to invite Communists into the government or subsidize outdated industries in exchange for Soviet oil shipments.) Neither the Common Market nor COMECON imposed any real restrictions on it, instead they both helped to extend its decision-making power in the world of economy.³⁵

³⁵ See S. W. Arnott, *The Political Economy of Austria* (Washington, 1982); F. Breuss, *Österreichs Außenwirtschaft: 1945–1982* (Vienna, 1982); S. Richter and Klára Székffy, *Ausztia gazdasága* (Budapest, 1987); E. Streissler, "Das Ende des Keynesianismus," *Wirtschaftspolitische Blätter*, no. 3 (1982), and Gunther Tichy in Mantl, ed., op. cit.

Viewed from an ivory tower, that country might be called a parasite, but I think we should just say it behaved like any shrewd businessman.

Can Austria be considered to have been sovereign up to the end of the Kreisky era from a military point of view? Definitely not, if we consider the innumerable written and unwritten regulations restricting the country's armament. The awareness that it could have withstood an attack for only a few days had the Warsaw Pact tanks stationed on its frontiers started moving, could not have bolstered self-confidence. I have already mentioned the shortcomings of its air defense. Essentially, its sovereignty depended on the three "nays" declared by others: foreign troops were not stationed on its territory, Soviet missiles (allegedly) were not targeting to its large cities, and it was no secret that NATO would not abandon a neutral good friend if it were attacked from the East.

For their part, the Austrians added a few tough "ayes" to these "nays." They announced that the declaration of neutrality, which prescribes the protection of this neutrality "with every available means," makes armament their duty. Later, "available" was replaced by the more forceful term of "expected," and Austria's military leaders did all they could to show how much the country's military budget lagged behind the military expenditure of countries of similar size, adding that it is to be "expected" of Austria to catch up. In 1975, a military doctrine was formulated to supplement the law on neutrality providing for circular defense worthy of a neutral country: strategic maps also studiously showed the possible NATO crossing routes as a potential threat. Even if Austria's neutrality did not emulate the Swiss model, its military organization certainly did. Compulsory military service was introduced, the reserve militia (*Landwehr*) was assigned an important role in defense in order to check incursion and hamper occupation by a possible aggressor. The budget allotted for the purchase of more modern military technology was gradually increased.

This notwithstanding, to feel really sovereign, Austria had to look East and compare itself with the Communist states. This was where it had to play the role of a small regional great power while enhancing the mythical nature of the common Central European fate, and where it had to gather strength for negotiations with the West. Communist leaders sought contacts with Vienna in the hope of gaining acceptance

by points further west and, conversely, Austria became the gateway to the East. The two opposing sides needed Austria as much as they had needed Switzerland during World War II. Its only rival for this position was Finland, which started at a far worse position. All this probably would have been inconceivable without Kreisky, who proved to be the right man for overcoming the image of Austrian politicians as parochial by joining the Brandt-Palme duo, on the one hand, and by giving a Social Democratic (and, at the same time, European) ideological legitimation to the Austrian model, on the other, as well as for gaining an opening through the Iron Curtain which separated Austria from Hungary, the "happiest barrack"³⁶ in the East.

After a while Austria began to feel there were fewer restrictive rules and, therefore, it had a larger field for maneuvering. Since the occupation was the point of departure of its reasoning, it could measure the growth of sovereignty with relative precision—which is rare in history. It had influence, it could accomplish things; whatever Austria needed, it had the money, contacts, and cunning to acquire. Frequently, it was enough just to wait for offers to come, and then accept them. It had every right to think its sovereignty was real. If only the Common Market were less unwilling....

³⁶ See P. Haslinger, *Hundert Jahre Nachbarschaft: Die Beziehungen zwischen Österreich und Ungarn: 1895–1994* (Frankfurt, 1996). The K.u.K. (Kreisky und Kádár originally, "Kaiser und Königlische" referring to the institutions of Austria-Hungary) relationship is an exemplar: it tells everything there is to know about Austria's virtual sovereignty or, at least, how comparisons with its eastern neighbors helped this sovereignty: "the Russians had left our country, but they are still in yours and had in fact again overrun Hungary in 1956; we drive Volkswagens, you drive cheap East-German Trabants; you need our money but we don't need yours; we are in the vanguard of the Western world while you are, at most, in the Eastern, and—don't forget—we weren't so far apart in 1945..." We know that Austrians could spend hours repeating these commonplaces while constantly assuring the Hungarians how much they nevertheless (!) love the temperamental but hospitable *Ungar*. Condescendingly and pityingly, they say: "we in the Free World will help you when you restless people get into trouble again—remember 1956. But it seems you may have learned something from us under Kádár, and are getting the idea how to outwit the world."

*A Country without Qualities*³⁷

Freedom from democratic control,
equality in leading bodies,
brotherliness in pricing.

Robert Menasse

It is now 1997, the Golden Age has long ended. National pride is more or less extant (though there is a noticeable change in the trend and fewer people consider themselves members of the Austrian nation), and no spectacular tragedy has occurred either, Austria is intact and prospering quietly. I cannot even say that there is a tremor beneath the surface and a new world is in the making which Austrians stubbornly refuse to take note of, that the ornaments of their national identity lie in the dust, their sovereignty is in ruins, and yet they continue believing that "they are different." On the contrary, the political and cultural elite—with no less practical acumen than before and making use of the inertia of national self-esteem—is almost imperceptibly leading the country toward an empire where the question, "how sovereign are we, Austrians?" no longer makes sense. More specifically, it is passing through an age when diminution of sovereignty, never firmly established (or literally bomb-proof) has become obvious. Even more specifically, Austria is acquiring surplus sovereignty before it has to face a deficit in its sovereignty, it forestalls possible defeat by victory or, at least for the time being, the Austrian state is successfully selling this strategy to the citizens. In the meantime, it is butchering, excuse me, putting to sleep, nice and slow, the sacred cows of national identity through its negotiations on European Union membership and in related disputes on the question of neutrality. It is sacrificing its identity for a new—more normal?—identity.

Before Europe appeared on Austria's horizon, a few things happened in the country leaving their imprint on the sovereignty-consciousness of the people. One does not have to be a psychologist trained in Vienna to suspect that in addition to pleasure in work well-

³⁷ See Menasse's book bearing this title. R. Menasse, *Das Land ohne Eigenschaften*.

done, a great deal of luck and even more repression, self-deception, overcompensation was needed to create this previous harmony, which can readily boomerang when all is not so well, when Lady Luck turns away, and a new generation grows up. Perhaps I have dwelt too much on motifs that should be forgotten or relegated to the subconscious. So, let us take a look at Austria, this country favored by fortune. In retrospect it is hard to see clearly all the great risks Viennese politicians took when they put all their stakes on escaping from the occupation-zone system and the "common German fate."

After 1955, the Soviets remained within a sixty mile radius of Vienna in Hungary, and the lightnings of the storms of 1956 and 1968 struck very close to Austria. In 1955 it was hard to say whether the Soviets' westward expansion had ended. The threat of a third world war was real, and had it broken out, Austria would have stood in the midst of falling bombs waving the scorched pages of the Austrian State Treaty, trusting in the tacit promise of Western powers to come to the aid of their "Western-oriented ideological kin," as Austrian politicians liked to call their regime, from their nearest base in Bavaria. Eventually, Austria decided to bet on the continuation of the thaw in relations that began after 1953, on a future *détente*, hoping in the power of the self-fulfilling prophecy. In any event, it tried to set an example, in its own interest. At that time, mediation could have easily meant ending up between two chairs on the floor, and Austria could have been tormented by the old doubt whether, being a poor and small country, it was viable at all. When the politicians bet on long-range *détente*, they also assumed that the Germans would not overdo it and the conflict between the two German states would not really diminish that much. For this reason, and not only because of the sad consequences of the *Anschluss* nor because the world would have looked unfavorably on another all-German fraternizing, it was worth escaping the German past.

Austria's geostrategic views proved correct over the decades. Blocs were fixed, the Iron Curtain could be crossed only in one direction, from West to East. There was no threat of a military attack, business rivalry, economic refugees, or waves of criminals from the East. In this sense, Austria was indebted to the Communist system which cast Austria in roles that only improved its self-esteem even when the rare holes in the Iron Curtain appeared; the country was shown up as

a generous source of aid, a teacher, it took in refugees, and gave sanctuary. Let's not waste words on the rich uncle and the Westernizer roles we know so well in Eastern Europe. We might say melancholically that it is easy to become a self-confident nation when everything is working for it. It is easy to become a sovereign state when no one really threatens it. It is easy to create the Austrian Miracle in the post-war period of spectacular reconstruction, to write the Austrian Model chapter in the success story of the Western welfare state. But what happens if the wind shifts from one day to the next in the immediate vicinity, at a time when the country begins to show signs of fatigue? What is to be done in the great East European earthquake that followed the awaited *détente* if Austria loses a part of its self-confidence in the meantime? If it finds that the virtual is no longer real?

What went wrong with the Austrian machinery during the past two decades? Something must have happened. Today one-fourth of the country backs Jörg Haider, who is flirting with the idea of pan-German nationalism, even Nazism, and who—counting on the fading influence of the establishment—has proclaimed the program of the Third Republic, an allegedly direct democratic and authoritarian "social community of people," a community without parties.³⁸

1. The "other Austria," a small group of rather Leftist liberal and primarily Viennese intellectuals, had unsparingly repudiated the so-called "life lie," (*Lebenslüge*) the victim myth of the Second Republic, in the eighties, especially in the wake of the Waldheim scandal. Naturally, this did not mean an end to the myth but the beginning of a systematic reinterpretation of the past (*Vergangenheitsbewältigung*), and also the polarization of public opinion. In the course of this self-examination they found the proverbial skeleton in the closet, sometimes even literally. The syrupy German-Austrian *Heimatfilms* (homeland movies) were replaced by *Anti-Heimat* literature, represented by authors like Peter Handke, Thomas Bernhard, and others.

2. Unification made Germany a real world power whereby even former East Germany—what a shame—outstripped Austria in many

³⁸ See C. Leggewie, "Millenniumsdämmerung: Notizen zur österreichischen Lage," *Transit*, no. 10 (1995); Scharasch, op. cit.; János Mátyás Kovács, "Haider in Ungarn: Notizen zum postmodernen Populismus," *Transit*, no. 11 (1996).

respects which, compared to this new Germany, seemed again tiny, the size of a medium German state. Austrian self-esteem is now facing a new German self-confidence.

3. The two-party social partnership is showing cracks, the state sector is disappearing (being privatized), teeming with corruption scandals (cf. *Skandalrepublik*), tough modernization measures are postponed, the cumbersome parity system is slow to react to the challenge of globalism, the slimming of the top-heavy welfare state is dragged out. There are increasing quarrels between the "reds" and the "blacks," citizens turn away from politics and tend to succumb to the temptation of populism instead of to the lure of new—"green" and liberal—parties.

4. Austrian economic development has slowed, approaching stagnation. The new Asian competitors are rapidly overtaking Austria, which was caught unprepared for the information revolution. Overregulation, the bureaucratic welfare state, and the powerful union lobby behind it, are strangling the economy. The European Community is closing ranks, COMECON is dead and, although there is still some money to be made from the post-Communist transformation, East and Central European business rivals have also appeared on the scene.

5. As a result of the dissolution of the blocs, East-West mediation has largely lost its meaning. Eastern Europe wants to become a part of Europe and not Central Europe, and in the process (of joining NATO, for instance) tends to bypass Austria. Meanwhile Germany is becoming the Central European power. The Iron Curtain is no longer there to protect the Alpine country, for which it is difficult to see itself as the island of peace. It suddenly finds itself very much in the East (hitherto having been the easternmost western state; it may now become the westernmost eastern state) next to a powderkeg. Economic, instead of political, refugees pound (not knock) at the door. Due to the growing impoverishment of the United Nations and its accumulating failures, being the seat of a United Nations organization is no longer a source of pride. As for the Third World...sorry, what does the term mean?

6. Overshadowed by Germany, Austria, this cultural great power, again looks parochial, lowbrow and old-fashioned. Its museums, con-

cert halls are increasingly said to be boring. Austrian joviality is at times strained. The proud "we're doing well" conviction is fading while frustration and envy are on the increase, refugees are denied entry more often than not. Kaiserschmarren does not taste as good anymore at the Heuriger.

"What does it mean to be an Austrian today?" This question reflecting insecurity is again raised in the mid-nineties after a seemingly completed nation-building. Are the Germans who live in the Alps (and who feel increasingly uncomfortable) the Austrians? Or, are they people whom less and less self-respecting East European businessman will deal with anymore? Or, are they the people hanging onto their desks in some government office? I would not like to exaggerate for, actually, the problem is not so acute: Russia may yet find its own self, the new German epic may come to a standstill, and the need for happy Austria may yet arise. The millennial celebrations are here, historical consciousness is on the rise, and even if the political and cultural identities are shaken, no one can take away nature awareness from the tourist republic. There will always be a need for natural parks.

All the same, by 1989, the Austrian political elite drifted into an unusual situation: it had to make decisions. The questions involved were vital and similar in nature and magnitude to those they faced before signing the Austrian State Treaty. There were three options. One, follow the same traditional course of "let's keep going, something will happen" (*weiterwursteln*); two, follow Haider, who loudly criticizes certain elements of identity of the Austrian Golden Age (welfare state, parity system, etc.) while extolling others (Austria's innocence, Austrian virtues, etc.); or, three, escape forward to Europe. The rules of political competition excluded the second, though some of the ideas of the populist leader were quietly adopted (for instance, the tightening of regulations on aliens). The first gradually lost ground. As a local prophet of the Central European idea observed with self-directed irony: destitute refugees sleep under the symbolic East-West bridge swept by howling winds. If Austria insists on embarking on a separate course, it risks growing apart from the rest of the world, and join the dubious company of those fallen behind, those not going anywhere, those embroiled in wars. Despite the risks involved, Europe seemed very attractive.

Europe held out the promise of replacing the worn-out spare parts of the Austrian Model and the assurance that in case fundamental structural changes become necessary, it will alleviate the pains of transition and assume some of the political responsibility for reforms. The prospect it offered was in plain language and also hard to substantiate ("to remain Austrian in Europe"), a new national identity without having to discard the old.³⁹ Austria wished both to change (normalize) and not to change its identity. Instead of an either/or, it should be an either and or choice, was the way an uncommitted intellectual put it. However, there was still one problem. A basic element of the original model—neutrality, what else?—had stood in the way of Austria's admission to the European Union for about three decades. Viennese politicians began to ponder how to extricate themselves from this tricky situation. It would be unworthy and stupid to openly disown the ideology that created the state, indeed, the nation, since three-quarters of the people believed in it and, anyway, there is time enough to make concessions when negotiations begin. Stubborn insistence would be just as stupid because it would only intensify the already present aversion to Austria's capriciousness. Besides, the former Soviet Union, the guardian of Austria's conscience, is indisposed for the moment; so it is now or never.

Creeping Commitment

When Marshall Kulikov, with six times eighteen decorations on his chest and stomach, visited our

Parliament, I considered perpetual neutrality important for the sake of Austria's security and independence.

Felix Ermacora

Austria, which was highly sensitive to events in the East, reacted much sooner than the West to the onset of the agony of the Soviet regime. When in 1987–1988 it saw the unbelievably rapid expansion

³⁹ To those urging long-range and radical changes, Chancellor Vranitzky's advice was that those with visions should see a doctor.

of the independence of neighboring states, and after it put out its feelers in Moscow toward the increasingly business-like Soviet leadership, eager to know the chances of a nod for its Brussels entry, it did not hesitate and dispatched a letter to Brussels in the summer of 1989. It proudly announced, "We're coming, let us in, and you might as well know that we have certain conditions." The second (and last) sentence of its application was practically "engraved" with its insistence on perpetual neutrality.⁴⁰

The same Austrian attitude again, they thought in Western Europe. They seek admission and at the same time demand an occasional leave of absence when they see their neutrality threatened. The same old Austrian "reservations" that were rejected (and smiled at) previously. The exception strengthens the rule, say the Austrians. What is it they have been usually so insistent about for decades while pleading to be admitted? They keep asserting that in case of conflict between the European Community and neutrality, they will choose the latter. In case of war between an European Union member state and an outsider, in case Brussels orders politically motivated economic sanctions or arrogates the right to determine the meaning of neutrality in any other way, they will suspend implementing the obligations imposed by membership and opt out.

The instinctive reaction in Brussels was that if Austria behaves according to the old line, then Brussels will follow suit. It will stiffen the rules and let Austria know that there is no hurry, there are no intermediate solutions like the free trade agreement in 1972. Brussels has been working on totalizing the internal market at least since 1985, since Jacques Delors wrote his White Book. If something is total it is unqualified and there is no room for games. It is either membership or nothing. Brussels had no wish to keep ambiguous relations and, therefore, waited two years before answering the Austrian govern-

⁴⁰ See G. Kunnert, *Spurensicherung auf dem österreichischen Weg nach Brüssel* (Vienna, 1992); G. Kunnert, *Österreichs Weg in die Europäische Union. Ein Kleinstaat ringt um eine aktive Rolle im europäischen Integrationsprozess* (Vienna, 1993); A. Mock, *Heimat Europa: Der Countdown von Vienna nach Brüssel* (Vienna, 1994); S. Nonhoff, *In der Neutralität verhungern?* (Münster, 1995); H. P. Ott, ed., *Österreich in der Europäischen Union* (Lahr, 1995).

ment's letter. Brussels will not shoulder the burdens while Austria flirts with the Soviets and parades in a dove costume. It will not play the hawk while Austria and Germany incite the Slovenes and Croats. Have they forgotten that Francis Joseph is long dead?—the more malicious Eurocrats in Brussels snapped.

Brussels should realize, Austria countered, that the country has come a long way since the fifties when its leading politicians called the Common Market a "capitalist bourgeois bloc" which no self-respecting Social Democrat wanted any part of. As a Christian Democrat prime minister once said, Austria will not sell its neutrality and sovereignty for a bowl of lentils just to be admitted.⁴¹ At that time, the Austrian State Treaty was still fresh in memory and so was the Swiss analogy. How could Austria join an organization which works in "personal union" with NATO and would again closely link the country with Germany, and which, furthermore, has a central decision-making organ that would govern Austria, and which practices differential economic treatment to the detriment of the outside world (including Austria's eastern partners), argued the Austrian politicians, not entirely under Soviet pressure. Austria wants no part of this, it wants to remain neutral economically, too.

However, the temptation was not negligible. Upholding its principles, Austria joined the EFTA, and it also wanted to join the EEC since 1961, though under impossibly strict conditions. It demanded to be allowed to break the rules of the Community in case of war (interpreted very broadly), to withdraw from the organization at any time, to contract freely with third states, and to have its relationship with the Community supervised by an Association Council—by way of protection against majority decisions—in which Austria and the EEC each have one vote. And it also wanted the assurance that in case of war (which it did not wish to enter) the living standards of the Austrian population would not drop. In view of this, it is not surprising that, aside from the free trade agreement (for which it had Germany to thank), Austria was given only an opportunity to adjust to the great players. "Autonomous following," say the Austrians

⁴¹ The first statement was made by Vice Chancellor Bruno Pittermann, the second by Chancellor Julius Raab. See Ermacora, *op. cit.*, pp. 107–109.

proudly, to avoid having to say "adaptation by force of necessity" At the same time they could only stand by while even Portugal was admitted. It should be added that the Western powers also did not want to risk a confrontation with the Soviets over Austria.

By the second half of the eighties, first the Christian, then the Social Democrat politicians⁴² began to realize that the advantages of flexible small economies were fast disappearing in the global market competition. A somewhat greater share of European integration would come in handy, the Austrians thought. In 1987, the government announced the slogan: "Global Approach." The "four freedoms" of the European Economic Area would do for a start, but once the

⁴² The Austrian Industrial Alliance, close to the Christian Democrats, initiated the dispute (see W. Hummer and M. Schweitzer, *Österreich und die EWG: Neutralitätsrechtliche Beurteilung der Möglichkeiten der Dynamisierung des Verhältnisses zur EWG* (Vienna, 1987); Krejci, Reiter, and Schneider, eds., *op. cit.* In other words, the industrial lobby makes Europe presentable. Of the parties, the ÖVP had always taken greater initiative than the SPÖ and there is incessant competence and prestige rivalry between them as to which one will take Austria into the European Union. On the main stages of the dispute, see Ermacora, "Neutralität pointiert!" in Krejci, Reiter, and Schneider, eds., *op. cit.*; W. Hummer, ed., *Österreichs Integration in Europa 1948 bis 1989: Von der OEEC zur EG* (Vienna, 1990); H. F. Köck, *Ist ein EWG-Beitritt Österreichs zulässig? Die völkerrechtliche und verfassungsrechtliche Zulässigkeit eines Beitritts Österreichs zur Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft* (Vienna, 1987); H. F. Köck, "Änderung und Aufhebung eines völkerrechtlichen Sonderstatus. Brötter am Problem der dauernden Neutralität in Zusammenhang mit dem Antrag Österreichs auf Beitritt zu den EG," in A. Mock, ed., *Verantwortung in unserer Zeit: FS für Rudolf Kirchschläger* (Vienna, 1990); P. Luif, *Neutrale in die EG? Die wirtschaftliche Integration in Westeuropa und die neutralen Staaten* (Vienna, 1989); A. Noll, *Neutralität, Staatsvertrag, EG-Beitritt* (Vienna, 1989); M. Rotter, "Von der integralen zur differentiellen Neutralität," *Europäische Rundschau*, no. 3 (1991); E. Sucharipa, *Neutralität und EG, Bundeswirtschaftskammer* (Vienna, 1993:b); K. Zemanek, "The Chaotic Status of the Laws of Neutrality," in *Im Dienst an der Gemeinschaft: FS für Dietrich Schindler*, ed. W. Haller et al. (Basel, 1989); K. Zemanek, "1966–1989: Gedanken zur Dynamik der dauernden Neutralität," in *Verantwortung in unserer Zeit: FS für Rudolf Kirchschläger*, eds. A. Mock and H. Schambeck (Vienna, 1990) and also Ermacora, Hafner, Reiter, Rotter, and Schweitzer in Krejci, Reiter, and Schneider, eds., *op. cit.*

European Community really becomes a union, they would amount to mere charity. Therefore, Austria should gradually abandon a strict interpretation of neutrality unless it wants to lose its sovereignty some other way (as a result of economic stagnation and all its political consequences). For four years the Austrian political and scholarly elite debated the question whether they should make concessions at all, then concluded that actually concessions were not necessary. The change was brewing. The disputants found all the possible legal loopholes and formulated all the conceivable ideological twists explaining why the European Union and neutrality were in fact akin. Again they included the neutrality clause in the application—if less aggressively than previously—risking that negotiations would freeze a second time.

What were these loopholes and ideological twists? Austrian legal experts suddenly discovered that some—flexibly interpretable—points of the European Community agreement, specifically, the defense and state of emergency clauses, protect the member states should they decide not to obey the common will in case of war, threat of war, political crisis, etc. (if abuses are suspected, the Strassbourg Tribunal decides whether non-obedience is permissible). Similarly, majority decisions in the Community are few and far between, therefore, in most cases, proposals infringing upon neutrality may be vetoed. Consequently, if admitted, Austria would not be at the mercy of others. Moreover, the European Community basic treaty is very liberal where special wishes of new members are concerned, which means that there is nothing to prevent securing prior political acceptance of the principle of neutrality. If this could be achieved, the Tribunal could not intervene either. Ireland is neutral and nevertheless a member of the club. If poor countries are admitted for strategic reasons, why not Austria, which is a rich country and would be a net contributor. The Community would gain by Austria's admission. Is this not worth a little uncertainty in principle? Anyway, how could the Community imagine totalizing the internal market with a gap between Northern and Southern Europe where Switzerland and Austria are? Wouldn't these two countries be important export markets and crossroads?

Ideologies are the work of those who no longer dare to believe in loopholes and rather make concessions on the question of neutrality.

They chose the difficult task of somehow erasing the adjective perpetual. They curse their predecessors for not being satisfied with just "lasting neutrality." Their chief argument culminates in the wisdom of *tempora mutantur*, that is, neutrality used to be nice and useful, nowadays it tends to be just nice. "It has lost its addressees."⁴³ The answer is no longer granted when it comes to the question of "against whom are you neutral?" The Soviet Union not only demanded, but also respected neutrality. There is no reason why Slobodan Milosević, Saddam Hussein, or Muhammed al-Quaddafi would do the same. Instead of violating the constitution, Austria should return to the narrow interpretation therein (officially, to the military core of the concept). Namely, that a country which does not belong to any military alliance and does not allow foreign troops on its territory, is neutral. Although, of course, the constitution could be amended. Austria has not signed binding international agreements, it was Austria which declared itself neutral, therefore, it should be Austria who rescinds this. Of course, the world has acknowledged this declaration, it would be good therefore if the consent of the great powers were also gained, if for no other reason than out of courtesy. This should be accomplished in peacetime.⁴⁴ Actually, there is no need to rescind neutrality since Austria, too, can still have recourse to the old distinction, that is, playing with the policy of neutrality while maintaining the legal principles of neutrality. Anyway, solidarity has replaced neutrality as the correct form of behavior. In 1955, Austria did not choose neutrality for its own sake, but because it was the means of securing sovereignty. Today it must act in solidarity (i.e. it must adjust to others) to avoid damages to its sovereignty. Neutrality is not a thing for itself, not a prison. Solidarity is just as nice a feature (and it is certainly nicer than being a free-rider). In truth, Austria has been *de facto* in the European Community for a long time. Curiously, staying outside *de jure* would increase dependence. Finally, the gem of this pragmatic reasoning is that working for world peace could be more effective inside the European Community than outside.

⁴³ See statement by Vice Chancellor Erhard Busek, *Standard*, June 12, 1992.

⁴⁴ The disintegration of the Soviet Union voided the Austrian State Treaty, so neutrality may be quietly forgotten, a few outspoken Austrian politicians argued.

It is not hard to notice that the search for loopholes is addressed to Brussels, while ideological considerations are prepared for domestic consumption. The Austrian government has begun a game of duplicity: first, it tries to convince the Community that there is a way to eat one's cake and have it too, but to be sure it begins to distance itself from the myth of neutrality and to prepare public opinion. When, after two years of silence, the European Community tells Austria that it does not trust its promises, the political leadership is left with no choice but to explain to the Austrian people why the Community is preferable to neutrality. We might even think that it was due to the persuasive power of the government that the results of the 1994 plebiscite on the European Union membership showed a surprising two-thirds majority support. Similarly to other countries, the economic arguments, which opened the persuasion campaign, would have probably resulted in a fifty-odd percent in favor. The almost seventy percent needed a little help from the Soviets again.

To be precise, it was the post-Soviets and it was indirect help. Until its dying moments, the Soviet Union continued to criticize, though with diminishing force, Austria's aspiration to join the European Community. But this was not the essence of its assistance. After 1989, security-policy considerations increasingly replaced economic considerations on both sides of the negotiating table. Disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and of the Soviet Union, as well as the war in Yugoslavia made the European Community more accommodating, and Austria began hurried preparations for admission because it saw the weaknesses of the United Nations security system in Yugoslavia and hoped that a future European security system will be stronger. Just to be on the safe side, the European Community still showed reluctance and in a long-awaited reply dated August 1991 it notified Austria of its willingness to negotiate, adding that the latter had better forget its conditions concerning neutrality. Furthermore, it should start thinking about an eventual amendment to the Constitution because neutrality "raises problems," and, yes, Austria may request special treatment but, of course, it should also know that Brussels does not favor separate paths. They were not impressed even when in the meantime Austria demonstrated that it can forget the broad interpretation of neutrality. During the Gulf War, the taboos of neutrality toppled

one after the other, when the Austrian government allowed the passage of American and Allied troops and war-material over territory under its jurisdiction in compliance with the Security Council resolution. Initially it said that it "voluntarily adopts" (i.e., it is not being served to) United Nations resolutions, then, calling the war a "policing action" serving collective self-defense, took the side of the anti-Iraq forces and joined the sanctions.⁴⁵ Solidarity versus neutrality, that is, backing out of perpetual neutrality. Soon Austria was again party to sanctions implemented, in part or whole, against Yugoslavia, Somalia, Liberia, etc. (Already in the Falklands war Austria complied with sanctions against Argentina.) Thus, Austria in practice became part of the collective security system.

There were no demonstrations in the streets of Vienna chanting slogans like "What have you done with our neutrality?" or "Where is our perpetual identity?" Among others, because government politicians simultaneously spoke—with sorrow—about the superannuation of neutrality, yet—using the who-if-not-Austria argument—claimed that Austria is going to Brussels as a neutral state.⁴⁶ Furthermore, they incessantly scared an already apprehensive populace with Soviet secession wars, eastern mafias, Bosnian refugees. Sarajevo is closer to Vienna than Bregenz, Europe would protect us from fascism (!), they kept repeating, almost convincing themselves that the island of peace can only be protected from the enemy on the great European sea. With Europe, Austria would even join "*Schengenland*," besides, collective security is considerably cheaper than armed neutrality. During the war in Slovenia, foreign aircraft again entered Austrian airspace; a missile may be launched in the Middle East and fall in Vienna any time—so why wait?

The magic mixture promoting accession was almost ready when the Maastricht Treaty was signed. Austrian politicians clutched at their heart: all their efforts have been in vain, they believed. It is impossible to smuggle neutrality into an integration which not only expands but

⁴⁵ The irony was that Iraq had recognized Austria's neutrality, while Kuwait had not.

⁴⁶ See Chancellor Franz Vranitzky's statement, *Standard*, January 27, 1993.

deepens relations, which plans a single European currency, common foreign and security policies, and advocates majority decision-making. Moreover, the SPÖ-ÖVP coalition was annoyed knowing it would not be able to sell this program domestically, no matter how much it talks about making the concept of neutrality "dynamic." Especially not with Haider convincing half the country of the ghastly deeds of the bureaucrats in Brussels. However, it also became obvious that to some extent Maastricht enhances the bargaining power of small outsiders because the European Union does not want to leave any (market or military) gaps on the map. Therefore, it sometimes relaxes the rules in order to ease access for neutral countries seeking admission. Sweden renounces its automatic neutrality, while Switzerland—which has always been more consistent in its interpretation of neutrality than Austria—wants no part of a centralized Europe. Both are ominous signs from the point of view of Austria, which adopted the strategy of "creeping commitment." Nevertheless, unswayed, it says it is better to be where the decisions are made and exert its influence on the members than to suffer the consequences of decisions made without it; that the obstructing minority and the principle of subsidiarity and also the plan for a "Europe of regions" will protect Austria from the many majority decisions; and, anyway, their bark is worse than their bite when it comes to a common security policy; it is enough to think of the public squabbles that have characterized the Western states since the outbreak of the Yugoslav conflict; since Austria is joining of its own free will, it may also withdraw anytime it chooses. In other words, Austria should join, wait things out, and perhaps depart. It has survived the United Nations as a neutral state, it will survive the European Union, too. And, off the record: no big deal if it will not.

However, Brussels proved generous. After the first shock of the results of the French and Danish referenda, it decided to expand the integration before deepening it. The question of neutrality was left out of the agenda when negotiations started early 1993; it was replaced by economic issues, such as transit traffic, agricultural subsidies, environmental protection regulations, etc. It was not mentioned in the accession agreement, yet (therefore) both sides seemed satisfied. It is peculiar that no one talked about neutrality, allowing the other side to interpret the concept as it likes, at the same time, they used it as a tac-

itly understood argument in the great admission bargaining. Brussels reasoned as follows: if we force them to rescind the maxim of neutrality, they will balk at issues where they have the most bargaining power, in transit agreements, and to boot, their constituents will vote them down on the accession referendum; therefore, it is better to demand "only" a declaration that they will take part in the common foreign and security policies without reservation and will eventually join the West European Union and Partnership for Peace; if they consent to this, they can call themselves whatever they like, even perpetually neutral. The Austrian position was a mirror image of this tactic: if we scare them by saying we shall only marry them as neutrals and we can wait for the wedding, then they will be more yielding in negotiations on other more delicate issues; it does not involve much of an obligation if we adopt the creed that we shall support the common foreign and security policies which do not even exist yet and, when they will, they are not likely to be anything more serious than a kind of "soft security"; and when we return home from Brussels, we can proudly say to the people that we have won without giving away anything.

In March 1994, when negotiations ended, Austrian politicians were exuberant: Austria stayed neutral, its identity unchanged, the West was forced to concur, persistence paid off. As to why Austria was silent about its most precious spiritual possession, they said that neutrality was such a natural characteristic and so compatible with Europe that, and I quote, "the government dispensed with making it the issue of negotiations."⁴⁷ Austria has shown goodwill and, imagine, it won four votes for itself in the Council of Ministers in return. Does anyone have any idea how many votes Germany has, being ten times as big? Only ten.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ See the Austrian government report on the results of the negotiations *Bericht der Bundesregierung über das Ergebnis der Verhandlungen über den Beitritt Österreichs zur Europäischen Union* (Vienna, 1994).

⁴⁸ See Foreign Minister Alois Mock's speech delivered in the Austrian Parliament in March 1994 at the end of the negotiations. Ott, ed., op. cit., pp. 109–113.

Neutrality has died but no one dares to make out the death certificate, a Viennese journalist observed. An old business swindle, sneered another. An *Etiketenschwindel*: the label is old but instead of vintage wine the bottle contains vinegar. It may well be that the Austrian government missed a historical opportunity when it did not withdraw completely from the Russian sphere of interest by not rescinding the pledge of neutrality when it could easily have done so, say, between 1991 and 1993. Today, with the end of "Euro-phoria," it would not be easy to amend the constitution and discard the ballast of neutrality. It is possible that Austria could already have joined NATO also, but instead it doggedly crawls toward the non-existent security system of the European Union because it clings to a decreasingly realistic "real-fiction." In opting for creeping commitment, Austria bargained cautiously about its own sovereignty. It realized that the neutrality it had to assume by necessity as a restriction on its sovereignty in 1955, but which it later was able to use to enhance sovereignty, again began to impinge on its freedom of movement. Right now, with sudden concern for its internal sovereignty, all but forgotten in the Golden Age when it lived in comfortable coalitions and citizenry did not interfere from below, it is hoping that military security and economic growth within the European Union will bring "more" sovereignty than political subordination takes away. In the early nineties there was a risk that by not joining Europe on account of its adherence to neutrality-based sovereignty, the citizens will punish the government for an ensuing diminution of the country's economic or military sovereignty.

Therefore, it had better keep the traditional identity elements of internal sovereignty in reserve. Furthermore, Austria should not only not discard neutrality, but should proclaim that the country is a veritable gift for the members of the Union—Austrian politicians argued. They need Austria because it is rich, stable, cultured, and environment-friendly (as a matter of fact, the European Union adopted Austria's stricter environment protection standards, not vice versa), and also because it links the Union with the late Eastern bloc (a novel element in this argument is the claim that Austria introduces Eastern applicants to the integration). Let the whole world learn again that Austrians are not Germans. The evidence being that Austria accepted

German as one of the official languages of the Union only on the condition that it would be supplemented with Austrian words. An appendix was agreed upon, which includes the following words, among others: *Erdaepfel* instead of *Kartoffel* (potato), *Faschiertes* instead of *Hackfleisch* (meatloaf), *Karfiol* instead of *Blumenkohl* (cauliflower), *Marille* instead of *Aprikose* (apricot), *Paradeis* instead of *Tomate* (tomato), *Ribisel* instead of *Johannisbeer* (currant).

A Change of Identity?

Austria's honeymoon in the European Union has ended. It is now figuring out how membership affects its sovereignty. It is comparing things which are partly non-existent yet: a future increase in security, a possible political subordination, expansion in the scope of economic opportunity in some respects, its diminution in others. Meanwhile, it compares the change in internal sovereignty with that of the external.⁴⁹ No one can be reasonably expected to ask intelligent questions in this conceptual chaos. Even Austria's previous virtual sovereignty was easier to grasp than its present "tensile" sovereignty.

Austria recently applied to the European Union for an observer status. Somewhat impatiently, it was asked if it would not rather be a member. Lately, leading Social Democrat politicians have also begun to openly talk about NATO membership. No one mentions Waldheim anymore, though his book, *The Answer*,⁵⁰ just appeared without, however, any revelations about his past even after ten years. Well, he has done his duty. And not just during the war. The unheard-of international isolation at the time of the scandal helped his colleagues realize that the stubborn *mir san mir* (we are us, or, bluntly: who cares what you think?) attitude is an insufficient basis for sovereignty. The ex-president is still *persona non-grata* and still on the American watchlist. Everything is normal in Austria and getting more normal by the day.

⁴⁹ See Fritz Breuss, "Erste Spuren des EU-Beitritts in Österreichs Wirtschaft," *Wirtschaftspolitische Blätter*, nos. 3–4 (1996).

⁵⁰ Waldheim, *op. cit.*